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Foreword 
Productivity growth is a precondition for increasing people’s welfare and maintaining 
competitiveness in a globalized economy. Low total factor productivity is the key reason 
for persisting poverty and social deprivation in many developing countries. The challenge 
for them is not only to devise more productive ways of doing business as such, but also to 
accelerate the structural transformation from low-productivity activities in agriculture, 
trade, and services to more knowledge-intensive activities that require a skilled workforce, 
produce a higher added value, and exploit the potential offered by inter-firm specializa-
tion. Undoubtedly, the main driver of structural change is the private sector. Still, govern-
ments have an important role to play in setting policy frameworks that allow for competi-
tion among economic agents and foster innovation in society, in addition to their impor-
tance for correcting market failures and limiting unwanted social or environmental effects. 
It may thus be important to encourage activities that do not emerge spontaneously because 
they require the performance of several interrelated investments that exceed the possibili-
ties of individual entrepreneurs. It may also be important to promote activities that do not 
pay off immediately but will likely produce positive spillovers in a wider time frame. 
Governments may thus decide to step in and support structural change and learning proc-
esses towards more sophisticated and higher value-added activities. This is what industrial 
policy is all about. 
The term ‘industrial policy’ shall be understood here in its broad sense, as any govern-
ment measure, or set of measures, that aim and/or help to promote or prevent structural 
change in ways which the government views as desirable. ‘Industrial policy’ is thus not 
necessarily restricted to only supporting the development of the manufacturing sector, but 
may also contribute to promoting activities in agriculture or services. By the same token, 
industrial policy does not only address economic goals per se, but very often also target 
adjacent policy fields. In any case, the main aim of industrial policy is (or should be) to 
foster overall long-term growth in total factor productivity in ways which are economi-
cally viable, socially inclusive, and ecologically sustainable – i.e. that allow for “a devel-
opment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (definition of sustainability by the UN Brundtland 
Commission of 20 Mar. 1987). 
Even though there are still many controversies about the right degree, the right focus 
and/or or the right timing (and sequencing) of intervention, it is now widely accepted that 
industrial policy may work well in countries with meritocratic civil services, effective pub-
lic administrations and institutionalized systems of ‘checks and balances’ that ensure a 
sufficient degree of political inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability. Opinions, 
however, diverge with regard to the role of industrial policies in low- and lower-middle 
income countries where financial resources are often severely limited and some core insti-
tutions still need to develop. In any case, the appropriate policy mix is unlikely to be the 
same as in rich countries, because both the requirements and the capacity for intervention 
and support are substantially different. Yet, most empirical case studies of industrial pol-
icy focus on the old industrialized countries or the global success stories of technological 
catching up in East Asia and Latin America. Much less is known about the quality, the 
experiences, and the outcomes of industrial policies in low- and lower-middle income 
countries. Further empirical research will be needed to this end. 
This report on industrial policy in Tunisia hopes to make a contribution towards filling 
this gap. It is part of a research project on ‘Industrial Policy in Low- and Lower-Middle 
Income Countries’ funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (BMZ) and supported by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Besides Tu-
nisia, country cases included Egypt, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Syria, and 
Vietnam. The project also comprised a background report which takes stock of the indus-
trial policy debate and discusses the peculiar challenges faced by less developed countries 
(Altenburg 2010). The findings presented in this paper have been obtained in the course of 
two research stays, which were possible thanks to the financial support of BMZ and the 
logistical support of GTZ. In the course of these stays, numerous interviews were made 
with policy makers, business representatives, and sector experts, which crucially comple-
mented the (limited) number of written contributions in this regard.1 This has only been 
possible thanks to the generous and helpful support of both Tunisian and foreign represen-
tatives. I am particularly indebted to the Tunisian Ministry of External Affairs (MAE), the 
Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Energy, and SMEs (MIEPME), the GTZ Programme for 
the Support of Entrepreneurship and Innovation (PAEI), the German-Tunisian Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce (DTIHK), and many others whom I cannot mention for lack of 
space. My warmest thanks and best regards to all of them.  
 
 
This study was finalised before the outbreak of the protests which have led to the downfall 
of President Ben Ali. These events show that the successful socio-economic liberalisation 
and modernisation which Tunisia has undergone in the last two decades – not least as a 
result of the regime's policies themselves – have not been accompanied by political re-
forms which could have allowed it to defuse or accommodate the mushrooming discontent 
at social level. Even though the regime had rightly identified youth unemployment and 
mounting social disparities as the key challenges, it has not been able to correct and over-
come them. The example of contemporary Tunisia therefore points not only to the poten-
tials and opportunities which industrial policy offers in and for developing countries, but 
also to its constraints and limits. 
 
 
 
Steffen Erdle     January 2011 
                                                 
1 These interviews complemented the field research I had carried out from 2001–2003 in the context of a 
research project on ‘Elite Change in the Arab World’, which had been hosted by the Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik and funded by the Thyssen Foundation. The results formed the basis of my Ph.D. the-
sis on ‘Ben Ali’s ‘New Tunisia’ (1987–2009). A case study of authoritarian modernization in the Arab 
world’ which has recently been published. 
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Summary 
Tunisia’s industrial policy has achieved very respectable results during the past two dec-
ades. A previously semi-closed and inward-oriented statist economy (heavily dominated 
by the public sector and insulated from foreign competition) has increasingly been turned 
into an outward-oriented and export-fuelled market economy, which is based on the manu-
facturing sector, and run by private entrepreneurs. In this way, a largely rent-based, lower 
middle-income developing country has been transformed into an increasingly skill-based, 
and industry-driven ‘emerging economy’, which has produced growth rates and welfare 
gains well above the regional average and not too far from the world’s frontline econo-
mies. Importantly, Tunisia has absorbed the numerous shocks that have shaken the MENA 
region since the beginning of the 21st century relatively smoothly. It has done so better 
than most of its neighbours, and much better than analysts predicted some time ago. 
Why has Tunisia managed to prosper, economically speaking, despite the ongoing pres-
ence of structural constraints? Because of four main factors: first, its geographical prox-
imity to, and cultural familiarity with, its European partners and clients, which provided it 
with an important competitive edge over rivalling countries; second, the ability of the gov-
ernment to correctly identify, and exploit Tunisia’s main comparative advantages vis-à-vis 
competing nations, which enabled it to make use of the economic opportunities and mar-
ket niches in its near abroad, and face up to the increasing presence of East European and 
Asian producers on these same markets; third, its ability to translate these analytical in-
sights into reasonably consistent policy choices; and finally, its ability to make a critical 
number of stakeholder groups in their society adhere to and support these choices. 
What has allowed Tunisia to achieve these results? First, there are very cohesive ruling 
elites whose leading representatives have achieved a substantial agreement on core policy 
issues (including on a ‘national project’ of industrial development). Second, when imple-
menting their policies, they can fall back on both a broadly meritocratic and professional 
civil service that is able to ‘deliver’, and a broadly inclusive and cohesive ruling party that 
is able to ‘follow up’. Third, their choices are largely compatible with the structures built 
up by their predecessors, as well as with the key preferences pursued by their main allies 
at home and abroad. All of this has substantially added to the coherence, consistency, 
credibility, and effectiveness of their policy. 
But it also must be recalled that the country is only half on its way toward becoming an in-
dustrial society: A first major problem is that the economic foundation of the Tunisian 
‘miracle’ is still rather fragile: The country is still highly dependent on both a handful of 
foreign markets, and a handful of economic sectors, whose main focus is moreover on sim-
ple assembly activities (although there is a qualitative upward trend in many sectors). A fi-
nal problem is the still high degree of fragmentation: between on-shore and off-shore sec-
tors, between import-substituting and export-oriented businesses, and between the few large 
and the many small firms. In fact, the Tunisian economy is still essentially a ‘dualist econ-
omy’, which has so far only been very partially integrated into global value chains. 
These problems are compounded by the fact that the Tunisian government continues to be 
torn apart between two conflicting goals: On the hand, it seeks to support the acceleration 
of local capital accumulation, and the deepening of industrial value chains, in order to pre-
pare for a comprehensive upward shift towards more sophisticated goods, and thereby 
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achieve the qualitative breakthrough towards a fully developed economy. This would re-
quire a concerted and sustained effort of both public and private actors, and absorb the 
country’s limited financial and human resources for years to come. At the same time, how-
ever, Tunisians are still very concerned with the preservation of the economic fabric (pre-
dominantly made up of financially and technologically weak family and micro-enterprises, 
active in the most protected sectors of the national economy) and the creation of new em-
ployment opportunities in order to absorb the country’s growing workforce and maintain 
socio-political stability. However, any wholesale opening of the national economy would 
inevitably lead to the forced market exit of many business actors (and the concurrent loss 
of many jobs). Even though the constitution of more integrated economic entities (with a 
more sophisticated product policy and larger international export radius) is still a declared 
industrial policy goal of the Tunisian government, it is difficult to enforce in the light of 
incompatible social policy concerns. The problem is that it is very difficult for such a 
small country ‘to have it both ways’; i.e. ‘to eat its cake and have it, too’. 
It must also be remembered that there are still a certain number of structural problems at 
an institutional level, which could jeopardise the success of this policy. First, the political 
system is still largely devoid of effective and institutionalised ‘checks and balances’, 
which could ensure the impartiality and accountability of policy making and policy en-
forcement. As there are no truly independent control mechanisms vis-à-vis key decision 
makers, this means that the necessary consistency of policy choices and their implementa-
tion on the ground entirely depend on the cohesion and determination of the political lead-
ership and the inner circle elites. Second, the legal-institutional framework is still full of 
politically motivated loop-holes, such as special clauses and waivers for politically impor-
tant pressure groups and clients, despite recent improvements at this level. Even though 
the government has generally pursued a policy of non-discrimination, it has maintained 
special legislation for supposedly sensitive sectors. The combination of political concen-
tration with legal-institutional fragmentation, however, heightens the sense of insecurity 
for the majority of business actors, fosters opportunities and incentives for rent-seeking, 
and thereby prevents from investing heavily in skill-intensive sectors, which would be a 
conditio sine qua non for the long-term success of the government strategy.  
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1  Introduction 
In most contemporary international rankings analysing worldwide performances in terms 
of socio-economic development, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) score rather moderately. In spite of significant improvements on numerous lev-
els, MENA countries are often seen as not having been able to fully capitalise on their 
generally favourable endowment with natural resources, and as lagging behind the more 
successful ‘newly industrialising countries’ of other world regions. This, however, is only 
a part of the picture. As these surveys tend to rely on – and result in – highly aggregate 
data, they are also liable to produce artificial averages that risk missing out the ‘essential’. 
The methodological dangers inherent in such quantifying international comparisons be-
come particularly palpable when looking more closely at the political economy of contem-
porary Tunisia.2 
It is generally acknowledged that this small country of currently 10 million inhabitants has 
often acted as an important ‘pioneer’ within its regional context.3 Tunisia was in the first 
group of Arab countries that introduced sweeping societal reforms in the 1950s; (unsuc-
cessfully) experimented with quasi-socialist (collectivist) policies in the 1960s; resorted to 
semi-liberal infitâh policies in the 1970s; and suffered the full blow of the various crises 
ravaging the region in the 1980s. Tunisia was also among the first wave of Arab countries 
to conclude an Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD); accede to multilat-
eral free-trade regimes like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO); and participate in trans-Mediterranean cooperation 
initiatives like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), and most recently the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). 
It is for these reasons that Tunisia has often been regarded by Western state officials, in-
ternational financial institutions, and private sector representatives as a political ‘role 
model’ in its regional context. Three arguments are usually advanced to support these 
claims: firstly, that Tunisians have pursued economic reforms with more determination 
than most of their neighbours; secondly, that they have adopted the necessary policies in 
this regard; and thirdly, that they have actually implemented these policies ‘on the 
ground’. This might also explain why there are three more things which most observers 
seem to agree on: firstly, that the Tunisian government actually does have a fully articu-
lated strategy for furthering industrial development (and has broadly adhered to this strat-
egy in its policies); secondly, that the processes of industrialisation which are observable 
in the country represent the outcome of said strategy (or are at least substantially influ-
enced by it); and thirdly, that this experience is also relevant to other developing countries. 
                                                 
2 The period under scrutiny is the time that has elapsed since the ‘Change’ of 1987: i.e. the ousting of 
President Habib Bourguiba (Tunisia’s first, and until then only, head of state since the achievement of 
independence in 1956 and the abolition of the monarchy in 1957) by his Prime Minister Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali (who has been ruling the country ever since). 
3 A major contributing factor to this ‘vanguard function’ seems to be the fact that as a relatively small and 
resource-poor country, Tunisia tends to be more immediately affected by developments in its geo-
political context, and consequently tends to react more vigorously than others vis-à-vis changes on this 
level. 
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The aim of this paper is to critically test these assumptions.4 It will focus on the follow-
ing issues: To what extent have Tunisians been able to achieve the key goal of industrial 
policy – namely long-term growth in total factor productivity? Does the Tunisian gov-
ernment really have a full-fledged industrial policy – one that is deliberate, coherent, 
and consistent? If yes, what are the specifics of this policy, in particular when compar-
ing it to the approaches pursued by other countries? What are the main qualitative dif-
ferences between the two political eras, the ‘First Republic’ of President Bourguiba and 
the ‘Second Republic’ of President Ben Ali? Which actors have been involved in craft-
ing these policies, and for which reasons? To what extent have these policies been fol-
lowed through in daily practice, and with which results? And finally, to what extent are 
the industrialisation processes observable on the ground the outcome of these policies? 
Is the Tunisian state really the driving force behind industrial development – or are other 
forces at work in this regard?5 
In order to provide answers to these questions, I will proceed in five steps: In Chapter 2, I 
will give a brief introduction into Tunisia’s political economy; this will include a short 
overview of the main economic policy choices by the new ruling elites, the institutional 
features of the new order they created, and the root causes of the systems crisis which 
brought down the Ancien Régime. In Chapter 3, I will elaborate on its consequences for 
Tunisia’s political system; this will include a brief overview of the decision making struc-
tures of the Nouveau Régime, the changing power relations among key socio-political ac-
tors, and the main preferences which they exhibit in their transactions. In Chapter 4, I will 
sketch out the new regime’s approach to industrial policy; this will entail a brief outline of 
what constitutes the overall parameters of its economic strategy, how these relate to ongo-
ing trends at the global level, and how they differ from the earlier era. In Chapter 5, I will 
present the main policy mechanisms which the new rulers have created, and specifically 
discuss whether these can be regarded as effective, inclusive, and sustainable. In Chap-
ter 6, I will elaborate on this by looking more closely into a particularly important policy 
tool, namely the Tunisian Industrial Upgrading Programme (PMN). In Chapter 7, I will 
conclude by examining whether Tunisian’s industrial policy has overall been able to pro-
mote ‘comprehensive development’, to what extent observable outcomes are attributable 
to policy choices, and to what extent they can serve as a model for others. And in Chapter 
8, I will come up with a number of suggestions of what can be done to fully exploit Tuni-
sia’s potential, and thereby reach the next stage of economic development. 
 
2  Opportunities and constraints for industrial development in the New 
 Republic 
Colonialism was late in coming to the MENA, but came with a vengeance. Tunisia was 
actually among the first countries of the southern Mediterranean to fall prey to European 
                                                 
4 For more information on the various definitions, rationales, and trajectories of industrial policy (IP), see: 
Altenburg et al. (2008); Noland / Pack (2003); UNIDO (2009). 
5 The author is not aware of recent academic publications with a nation-wide IP focus. Most available 
studies deal with specific sectors, have been written by practitioners or consultants, and have been 
commissioned by foreign donors or the Tunisian authorities themselves. Regrettably, for lack of time, 
the author has not been able to make use of works in Arabic, written by Tunisian authors for a local au-
dience. 
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expansionism, and it would remain under French rule for exactly 75 years: from 1881–
1956. This was not a long time compared to the trajectory of other countries, and the im-
pact of colonial rule on Tunisian society was much lighter than elsewhere. It was, how-
ever, long enough to change the fabric of that society. By establishing direct control over 
key assets, by tailoring productive structures to metropolitan preferences, by creating a 
modern bureaucracy, and by setting up a secular education system, the French made a de-
cisive contribution to transforming the overall parameters of social life. The structures and 
dependencies they created or fostered would not simply disappear with their departure, but 
would continue to cast their shadows for a long time to come. In Tunisia, like in other 
countries of the region, the main aim of industrial policy was thus precisely to neutralise – 
and possibly reverse – the detrimental effects of the colonial experience, while regaining 
control over the parameters of development (Owen 1981; Issawi 1982; Perkins 2004). 
To do so, the new ruling elites around Habib Bourguiba – the prime leader of the ‘pro-
independence movement’ which in turn rallied behind the Neo-Destour Party – could fall 
back on a number of assets. Their first major asset was a strong state bureaucracy which had 
effectively imposed its authority over the country, ‘taming’ autonomous powers at social 
level. There were no more local strongmen, tribal leaders or other parochial actors strong 
enough to openly defy the power of the capital. Their second major asset was a fairly homo-
geneous and integrated population that was devoid of major ethnic or religious cleavages 
(almost all Tunisians are actually Arab-speaking Sunnis). Their third major asset was a so-
cially mobile and educated middle class that also had important socio-political and profes-
sional traits in common. They were mostly social risers from the east coast provinces (‘Sa-
hel’), had received a modern training in French-inspired institutions, and experienced their 
political socialisation within the Neo-Destour. Tunisia had thus managed to achieve what its 
neighbours were only beginning to countenance: namely the promotion of national cohesion 
under the guidance of a strong, territorial state (Moore 1970; Hermassi 1972). 
A further important asset was the fact that national independence had essentially been won 
at the negotiating table, and that the ousting of the French had been achieved with a mini-
mum of casualties. The new polity was thus not overburdened from the very start by bitter 
memories about past ‘injustices’, and the desire to ‘settle scores’. Instead, it would be run 
by an elite of civil politicians whose views converged on a number of issues – e.g. the 
importance of settling conflicts with a minimum of violence, keeping the army out of poli-
tics, and giving absolute priority to national development (which they called the ‘supreme 
struggle’, or ‘al-jihâd al-a'lâ’). The majority movement within the new ruling elites was 
wise enough not to cut all ties to their former masters, or sever links with their neighbours. 
Rather, they would build on and harness the former’s still formidable resources and strate-
gic interests in the MENA (in conjunction with their country’s pan-Mediterranean heritage 
and their own pro-European outlook) to achieve what really mattered to them: namely 
building a modern nation state. It was clear to them that this would not be feasible without 
support from abroad (Deeb / Laipson 1991; Murphy 2002).6 
                                                 
6 These Tunisian concerns actually coincided with European designs. It must once again be recalled that 
the political project of a united Europe was from the very beginning linked to the process of decolonisa-
tion: From the perspective of Paris and other capitals, the establishment of a Common European Market 
was meant to at least partially compensate for the loss of one’s overseas territories. The progressive con-
clusion of association agreements with the newly independent countries of the southern Mediterranean 
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Bourguiba himself played a key role in all this: For him, as well as for those around him, the 
modernisation of society would have to go hand in hand with a concentration of power. Fol-
lowing his nomination as prime minister in 1956, his deposal of the last Husaynid Bey in 
1957, and his election as the new President of the Republic in his stead, Bourguiba followed 
a multi-track approach. He made sure no other force would be able to challenge his ‘Na-
tional Coalition’.7 He concentrated decision making powers within his own government 
apparatus. He created the conceptual and institutional parameters necessary for a rapid 
socio-economic modernisation of the country. And in doing so, he ‘accidentally’ destroyed 
the symbolical resources, as well as the organisational capacities, of political rivals and an-
tagonistic ideologies. (Prior to this, large parts of the country’s school and court system, and 
a significant share of its farm lands and real estate sector, had been under the direct control 
of Islamic scholars). The overwhelming powers he had acquired for ‘his’ new state would 
allow him to push through momentous reforms, particularly in the fields of social and edu-
cational policy, and with regard to family and gender issues.8 
In the overall framework of the Bourguibo-Destourian state, real power was now limited to 
those occupying leadership positions in the three institutions that truly mattered, politically 
speaking (also referred to as ‘as-sulta’ or ‘le pouvoir’ in local parlance). These were, first, 
the central state bureaucracy which had already been created by the Husaynid reformers in 
the 19th century, was further strengthened by the colonial authorities and finally captured by 
the ‘National Movement’; second, the Neo-Destour Party which, after pushing its rivals 
aside, had imposed itself as the ‘quasi-natural’ ruling party of the new polity; and third, the 
associations nationales, corporatist organisations for certain status groups (workers, farm-
ers, businessmen, women) that were created or seized by Destourians in order to integrate 
and control the population. Groups which had previously played a major role in the national 
struggle were either excluded from politics per se (Islamic scholars and jurists) or relegated 
to subordinate positions within the ruling alliance (labour leaders and businessmen). 
Henceforth, Bourguiba’s powers at the top of this system were close to being absolute. He 
was at once the head of state and of government, chairman of the Destour, minister of de-
fence, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. As such, he was endowed with 
sweeping decision-making powers. He could determine the guidelines of public policy; 
make or veto legal acts (which included the right to issue bills and rule by decree); appoint 
or demote senior officials (such as ministers, governors, ambassadors, magistrates, as well 
as the heads of the police and the army); and last but not least dissolve parliament and 
declare a state of emergency. As a result, he would totally dominate all other political ac-
tors in the new state, such as the council of ministers, the parliament, the judiciary, and 
even the ‘ruling’ party. Within just three years, Bourguiba, who had only been a primus 
inter pares in the struggle against the French, had become the supreme decision maker of 
the new polity. In this sense, the ‘Supreme Combatant’ (as he came to be referred to) com-
                                                                                                                                                   
(including Tunisia) from the late 1950s on would play an important role in this regard (cf. also 
Schumacher 1998; Jacobs 2003). 
7 The adoption of single-list majority voting for elections to the National Assembly proved decisive, as 
this excluded small parties from political power and thereby pre-configured political life for a very long 
time. 
8 The new civil status law which entered into force in 1957 was instrumental in this: it destroyed the legal 
bases of the traditional patriarchal family, liberated women from their religiously sanctioned depend-
ency on male family members, and prepared the ground for their active participation in the modern la-
bour market. 
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bined the powers and prerogatives of both the former Husaynid beys and the French rési-
dents-généraux. 
The above developments were only the first manifestations of what would become a full-
fledged party-state during the following decade. Party members captured the upper ranks 
of the state bureaucracy with the same ease as government representatives assumed con-
trol of the leading party bodies. Still, the Bourguibo-Destourian Republic was an inclusive 
rather than an exclusive system. In principle, the party welcomed any citizen, irrespective 
of his or her social status, profession, confession, race, gender or age. It was a priori pos-
sible for anybody to participate in its activities, or rise up through the ranks. The power to 
make strategic decisions, however, was reserved to a very small stratum of senior political 
leaders. The political order that resulted from these crucial first years was inclusive as long 
as one was willing to ‘play by the rules’ and bow to the leader; it turned exclusive as soon 
as one dared to question his choices or covet his place. The clear red line for any legiti-
mate political activity was the unity of the nation, as epitomised by the party’s monopoly 
and Bourguiba’s authority. Any attempt to cross either of those was nipped in the bud.9 
In the political project of the new rulers, industrial policy was clearly attributed a key role. 
It should enable citizens to break free from the shackles of misery and dependency, and 
lead a life in liberty and dignity (while allowing to mobilise the patronage resources nec-
essary for consolidating the party-state). On the way toward achieving these goals, how-
ever, they were confronted with a considerable number of serious challenges: In fact, most 
profitable and/or strategic assets had been owned or controlled by the French state or by 
European settlers. This applied to about 20 percent of arable land and 40 percent of farm 
produce. At the moment of independence, there were only 290 enterprises of more than 50 
employees, 85 percent of them owned by foreigners. Industry employed only 2 percent of 
the workforce, with very few Tunisians in executive positions. Finally, there was not a 
single institution of higher education in the entire country. This was, in short, “a classical 
peripheralised economy, with industry limited to an enclave sector dominated by foreign 
monopolies and oriented toward the demands of the colonial centre.”10  
These problems were actually compounded by the country’s geographical situation and 
demographic structure. A small nation of then barely five million people, it was flanked by 
two larger neighbours, one of which had just become independent (Libya), and the other of 
which was still struggling to do so (Algeria). Both would be led by rather quixotic, highly 
authoritarian regimes pursuing a politically expansive, pan-Arab agenda that did not really 
foster evolutionary change and peaceful cooperation in the region. Further, cross-border 
connections (in terms of trade, communication, and transport) generally followed a vertical 
(north-south), not a horizontal (east-west) direction. Economic exchanges among the 
Maghreb countries were negligible. In Tunisia itself, demographic and economic intensities 
declined along a North/East-South/West axis. The majority of people lived and worked in a 
narrow corridor along the east coast; the interior provinces along the Algerian border were 
                                                 
9 For these reasons, Bourguibo-Destourian Tunisia is usually associated with the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime type, as it was found in many other Arabs countries as well (cf. Pawelka 2000a; 
2000b for further reading). 
10 M. Romdhane quoted in Bellin (2002, 13). 
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far less populated and developed. These disequilibria (which have basically remained in 
place until today) posed (and still pose) severe challenges for policy makers.11 
Industrial policy was further complicated by the country’s fragile ecology and its rather 
moderate natural resources. Tunisia disposed of only few fossil and mineral assets (mainly 
phosphates and iron ore) and even more limited processing and refining capacities. Due to 
its semi-arid climate, summers are usually hot and dry, while winters are cold and humid. 
If at all, rain falls in spring, but this varies strongly over time. The very limited quantities 
of surface water and the equally limited number of irrigation facilities meant that Tunisia’s 
farming sector was (and still is) heavily dependent on seasonal rainfall. For socio-
historical reasons (like agnatic family structures and redistributive inheritance laws), most 
Tunisians toiled on small, fragmented plots with outdated and rudimentary tools. Further-
more, large parts of fertile lands were then still controlled by Islamic foundations or Euro-
peans settlers (the former being nationalised in 1957, and the latter in 1964). In short, Tu-
nisia has always had a strong potential as an agricultural producer (due to its fertile soils 
and short winters), but it was clear that exploiting this potential would require heavy in-
vestment at all levels. 
As a result of these structural constraints and intervening variables, but also following 
their own instincts and interests (as well as those of their main allies, the middle classes of 
the coastal provinces), the new rulers initially pursued a conservative economic policy 
which mainly focused on preserving macro-economic stability. Since the private sector 
was supposed to become the driving force of economic development, they tended to avoid 
every step that could possibly upset private property owners (many of them still foreign 
citizens). It soon became apparent, however, that such a ‘hands-off’ approach lacked any 
sound long-term perspective. There was simply no modern, indigenous business elite dy-
namic enough to assume the economic catalyst role ascribed to it. The small native bour-
geoisie, mostly confined to agriculture and commerce, had neither the means nor the skills 
(nor the guts) to kick-start industrialisation, and the rapid exodus of the European settlers 
further drained the country of the resources it needed for its development. 
The year 1961 thus saw a veritable u-turn in economic policy: from ‘liberalism’ toward 
‘collectivism’. The driving force behind this new policy was Ahmed Ben Salah, the for-
mer secretary-general of the national labour union, who was appointed minister of plan-
ning and finance. This new position offered him the opportunity to implement his vision: 
rapid, public sector-led, import substitution-based growth. In order to do so, he could util-
ise the assets which had fallen into the hands of the state after the departure of the French: 
including plants, ports, railways, mines, and banks. As a result of this new policy, the 
number of state-owned enterprises and public sector organisations increased from less 
than 25 in 1960 to about 185 in 1970, and their share of national investment grew from 1.8 
percent to 33.7 percent (cf. Belev 2000, 14ff. and 55ff. for further data about the growth of 
Tunisian SOEs and PSOs). This made the state the country’s largest proprietor, producer, 
investor, and employer – and eo ipso the prime ‘mover and shaker’ in economics and fi-
                                                 
11 Tunisia’s 24 provinces (gouvernorats) can be aggregated into 6 regional clusters: the Greater Tunis area 
(comprising Ariana, Ben Arous, Manouba, and Tunis-Ville); the North-East (Bizerte, Nabeul, Zag-
houan); the North-West (Béja, Jendouba, Le Kef, Siliana); the Centre-East (Mahdia, Monastir, Sfax, 
Sousse); the Centre-West (Kairouan, Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid); and the South (Gabès, Gafsa, Kebili, 
Medenine, Tataouine, Tozeur). 
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nance. By renaming itself from Destourian National Party (PND) to Destourian Socialist 
Party (PSD) in 1964, the ruling party formally and totally committed itself to this new line. 
It is important to understand, however, that collectivism did not mean socialism; it was 
still about national development, not class struggle. The objectives pursued by the regime 
had not really changed, only its strategies of how to attain them had done so. Economic 
planning was not so much a voluntary choice, but rather an emergency measure to com-
pensate for market failure. This is illustrated by the fact that private property continued to 
be protected by the law and respected by the state, only this time within the framework of 
the Plan, and under the guidance of the state. ‘Salahism’ not only claimed to offer a viable 
blueprint for the rapid development of a peripheral economy, but was also able to present 
itself as a direct extension of the Bourguibist project itself. However, this attempt failed for 
various reasons. It overstretched the regulatory capacities of the new state; it failed to raise 
enough foreign receipts to finance the quickly growing imports; it affected vital interests of 
key elite groups; and it alienated policy makers from their social support base. When all of 
these interests joined forces, the fate of Ben Salah was sealed. In late 1969, he was dis-
missed, arrested on charges of high treason, and sentenced to ten years of hard labour. 
As a consequence of this failure, the new Prime Minister Hedi Nouira spearheaded another 
policy switch: from an administered economy aimed at rapid industrialisation through col-
lectivism and protectionism, to a mixed economy containing a peculiar combination of 
import substitution and export promotion. There was a particular focus on manufacturing 
(mainly textiles) and services (mainly tourism) where Tunisia was supposed to enjoy ma-
jor comparative advantages: because of its reasonably skilled and cost-effective work-
force; its good institutional and physical infrastructure; its political and social stability; its 
proximity to major European markets; and its familiarity with European cultural habits. 
This new formula continued to reserve the lead role for the public sector, while offering 
more opportunities to private operators. But the launch of the infitâh was more than a sim-
ple re-adjustment of government policy; it implied a thorough redefinition of the ‘contract’ 
governing the relationship between state and society, or between ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’. 
Two laws, adopted in 1972 and 1974, ushered in this new era; the former opening up for-
eign trade, the latter focusing on domestic markets. In order to coax the private sector into 
assuming a more active role, the state offered a raft of incentives. These included extensive 
institutional and technical support, deployed through new state bodies like the Industrial 
Promotion Agency (API) or the Export Promotion Centre (CEPEX); fairly rapid and se-
cure returns (via high external tariffs, strict import quotas, restrictive licensing practices, 
etc.); and other direct or indirect subsidies (like long tax breaks, preferential credits, sub-
sidised inputs, etc.). In order to facilitate this process, civil servants were allowed to tem-
porarily or permanently work in the private sector. The result was up to expectations: 
About 800 new industrial ventures emerged the following years, effectively doubling in-
dustrial capacity, and laying the economic groundwork of today’s manufacturing sector. 
The private share in industrial investment went up from 22 percent in the 1960s, via 41 
percent in the 1970s, to 43 percent in the mid-1980s. The vast majority of the new firms, 
however, were very small, 94 percent starting with less than TD 500,000 and employing 
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less than ten workers (cf. Bellin 2002, 32ff. for further data about the growth of Tunisia’s 
private sector at that time).12 
It must be noted, however, that the relations between state and business were supposed to 
be governed by the rules of complementarity and subsidiarity: “Whereas the private sector 
focused on the least capital-intensive, the least technologically sophisticated, and the most 
immediately profitable branches, the state carried the burden of basic, heavy industries 
that were beyond the capability and interest of the private sector” (Bellin 1991, 51). This 
might also explain why the public sector continued to grow even during the infitâh period: 
The percentage of government expenditure of GDP further rose from 28.7 percent in 1972 
to 32 percent in 1984, while the share of transfers to SOEs as a percentage of government 
expenditure more than doubled: from 8 percent in 1972 to 17.5 percent in 1984. The result 
was an economy characterised by the awkward co-existence of four sectors: an offshore 
sector that was geared toward external markets and dominated by foreign players; an on-
shore sector that was heavily protected from competition and regulated by the state; a pub-
lic sector which included all large firms, and monopolised strategic sectors; and a private 
sector which primarily consisted of small business units, and focused on simple assem-
bling activities. 
At the end of the day, Hedi Nouira’s infitâh policy was nothing but a political hybrid: a 
compromise between the ‘disciples of the plan’, and the ‘partisans of the market’. On the 
one hand, the state encouraged private sector growth and foreign direct investment while, 
on the other hand, it tightly regulated market access and resource allocation. It also main-
tained direct control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economic system (which mainly 
concerned the mining, energy, transport, telecommunication, and banking sectors). Unsur-
prisingly, this mixed policy produced mixed results: It was successful in that it produced 
high growth rates for several subsequent years, rising living standards for broad social 
strata (particularly for the middle classes of the main urban hubs) and substantially en-
hanced opportunities for social upward mobility (mainly via the rapid expansion of the 
public sector). However, it was unsuccessful in that these positive results were achieved 
by ultimately unsustainable methods, and more specifically by constant deficit spending 
policies of the central state, made possible by the increasing availability of external rents.13 
In actual reality, Tunisia’s political economy suffered from a large number of structural 
deficits. The first major problem was the very narrow basis of the economic system 
(which made it very vulnerable to all kinds of external shocks). The bulk of national in-
come was derived from just a handful of sources, basically extraction (hydrocarbons, 
phosphates), agriculture (olives, fruits), manufacturing (clothing, textiles), services (con-
struction, tourism), and external transfers (development aid, migrant remittances). The 
second main problem was the lopsided structure of the national economy (which com-
bined a low degree of differentiation and specialisation with a high degree of fragmenta-
tion and sectorialisation). There were very few horizontal linkages between the aforemen-
                                                 
12 The main targets of Tunisian exports were the member states of the European Economic Community 
(EEC). This was mainly due to the overall distribution of purchasing power in the wider neighbourhood; 
the still substantial links with the former colonial metropolis; the low degree of economic integration 
among the Maghreb countries; and the rather limited interest of OPEC countries for Tunisian products. 
13 It is for these reasons that Bourguibo-Destourian Tunisia is usually qualified as a semi-rentier economy 
(cf. Pawelka 2000a, 2000b for further reading). 
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tioned four sectors of the Tunisian economy, which could have served as a launch pad for 
a sustainable course toward industrial development. Before being able to export, Tunisia 
was forced to import practically everything: from basic inputs past capital goods and spare 
parts to end products. This lack of integration not only undermined the twin goals of in-
dustrial consolidation and capital accumulation, it also drained the country’s financial as-
sets and cash reserves.14 
It was obvious that maintaining this system would ultimately hinge on the ability of the 
state to continuously secure financial inflows from abroad, while skilfully balancing the 
different elements of the ruling contract. Achieving this task, however, would be no easy 
feat, as the main sources of income were concentrated in highly volatile markets and thus 
liable to periodically occurring slumps. A deterioration of prices in any one of these was 
bound to immediately ‘ripple through’ to other sectors, and gradually ‘rub off’ on the en-
tire economy. This is precisely what happened when two consecutive droughts destroyed 
large parts of the local harvest in the early 1980s; financial inflows from exporting indus-
tries and migrant communities dried up (due to plummeting oil prices and contracting cus-
tomer markets); and financial costs incurred from servicing past loans and securing fresh 
money shot up (due to soaring dollar prices and worsening exchange rates). When the debt 
service ratio crossed the 20 percent threshold in 1983, reaching 33 percent in 1986, it was 
clear that the game was over; Tunisia was no longer in a situation to raise the external sur-
plus necessary for running such a system; it could have imported large quantities of either 
capital or goods, but not both of them simultaneously and indeterminately. 
Faced with deteriorating living conditions, youth unemployment, and public rioting, the 
regime began to fall apart. No longer able to secure its imports, finance its deficits, or ser-
vice its interests, it had no other option but to ask for foreign help. In 1986, the new Prime 
Minister Rachid Sfar concluded an ERSAP with the Bretton Woods Institutions. The dras-
tic spending cuts which this entailed, however, further exacerbated social conflicts. These 
were now spearheaded by Rachid Ghannouchi’s Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) 
which (after the political neutralisation of the labour unions) had become the only serious 
alternative to the incumbent regime. Bourguiba’s tendency to increasingly rely upon the 
armed forces for maintaining public order had an important side effect, namely the rapid 
political promotion of General Ben Ali, the former head of the national security service, 
who first became minister of the interior, then prime minister, and finally secretary-
general of the ruling party. When it finally appeared that this crisis might spiral out of con-
trol and bring down the system itself, part of the political elites acting under the leadership 
of Ben Ali decided to pull the emergency break: In order to avert a revolt ‘from below’, 
they agreed to reform the system ‘from within’. This necessitated the removal of Bour-
guiba whom they no longer regarded as a part of the solution, but as a part of the problem. 
                                                 
14 As Francis Ghilès (1996) has rightly observed, the weak point of the Nouira approach was that “it en-
acted a policy which encouraged exports and investment in the exporting sector but failed to encourage 
Tunisian companies to compete in international markets and discouraged competition in domestic mar-
kets”. The main purpose of this policy was actually “the reduction of unemployment among unskilled 
workers (…) and emigration to Europe. It was not part of a general strategy based on conquering new 
markets”. 
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3  The main actors and institutional parameters of the ‘New Tunisia’ 
The first hand-over at the helm of the state since the achievement of independence and the 
abolition of the monarchy happened so smoothly that most people only learnt about it 
from the morning news. During the night of 7 Nov. 1987, troops loyal to Ben Ali had oc-
cupied the most strategic premises without encountering serious resistance.15 Ben Ali jus-
tified his move by invoking Bourguiba’s incapacity to govern for health reasons. In his 
first speech as head of state, he not only promised to restore ‘law and order’ in the coun-
try, but also to admit (more) pluralism and participation in politics. At the same time, he 
vowed to abolish both the life-time presidency, and the automatic succession rule, which 
Bourguiba had established in 1974. He promised, in short, the launching of a ‘New Era’ in 
Tunisian politics, based on the restoration of the founding principles of the Bourguibist 
Republic.16 
The first phase of the New Regime’s political life lasted until 1989/90. Its main goal was 
to curb the multiple effects of all the crises that had sprung up during the closing phase of 
the old regime. Ben Ali began to carefully open the political system, and overhaul existing 
institutions. This included the systematic renewal of the regime elites, as well as the tai-
lored political integration of formerly ‘marginal’ groups. The presidency-for-life was abol-
ished, to the effect that the head of state could not serve more than three consecutive terms 
of five years each. Political parties were legalised, with the exception of those organised 
along religious, ethnic, or regional lines. The PSD was renamed the Constitutional De-
mocratic Rally (RCD), followed by the confirmation of Ben Ali as its chairman. At the 
same time, the new rulers carried on the ERSAP of their political predecessors, which con-
tained the usual elements of the ‘Washington Consensus’: stabilisation of external ac-
counts and state budgets; liberalisation of market access and foreign trade; reduction of 
state interventions and price distortions. Most progress was made on the macro-economic 
front, while foot-dragging was much stronger on micro-economic issues. But the struc-
tural deficits of the Tunisian economy basically persisted, as the Gulf Crisis would reveal 
shortly afterwards. 
One year after the ‘Change’, the leaders of the various political parties (including the 
MTI) signed a National Pact which spelled out the basic parameters of the ‘New Era’. In 
spite of this apparent agreement on substantive issues, however, peace was not to last for 
long: The regime was clearly unwilling to admit a religious party into the ‘political arena’, 
while the MTI was equally unwilling to sacrifice its dream of building an ‘Islamic state’. It 
was the first post-coup elections of April 1989 which rang the ‘funeral bell’ of the ‘Tuni-
sian Spring’. Disappointed by the regime’s adamant refusal to grant it legal status (despite 
the fact that they had renamed themselves Hizb an-Nahda, or Renaissance Party, to com-
ply with the party law), yet encouraged by the respectable electoral results of their ‘inde-
pendent’ candidates (as well as by the meteoric rise of Islamist parties in other Arab coun-
tries), the MTI decided to take the plunge: They openly defied the authorities, riding the 
                                                 
15 Several key figures of the Ancien Régime were literally arrested out of their beds and condemned to 
heavy prison sentences, but were subsequently pardoned or released on parole (apparently on condition 
that they stay out of politics for the rest of their lives). The ‘Supreme Combatant’ himself was escorted 
to his home town, Monastir, where he would spend the rest of his life (until his death in 2000) under 
house arrest. 
16  Cf. also S. Gharbi / F. Soudan: “Cette nuit-là…”, JA 1402, 18/11/1987, 32–41 
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wave of anti-Western feelings which swept the region during the Gulf crisis. Following an 
escalation of conflicts, the regime elites decided to ‘eliminate’ their only serious rival, 
sensing that they could do so with complete impunity at that particular junction. After two 
years of massive repression, the Islamist movement had de facto ceased to exist ‘on the 
ground’; its activists had been rounded up, its organisations dismantled, and its leaders 
imprisoned or exiled. 
The second phase of the New Regime’s political life lasted until 1994/95. The new rulers 
systematically re-asserted state power and reverted to central rule. Having crushed the 
Islamist movement, they began to target all those formations of the secular opposition and 
in civil society which openly declared themselves opposed to their rule or policies. This 
even included those who had initially sided with them and/or did not really compete with 
them (such as human rights or labour activists). At the same time, the former intensified 
the pace and scope of socio-economic reforms and renewal. They systematically replaced 
the remaining elements of the ‘Elite Bourguiba’ by a new generation of techno-
bureaucrats who took over senior positions in the state apparatus. They also systematically 
transformed the heavily regulated and insulated statist economy they had inherited into an 
increasingly outward-oriented, market-driven economy that would be attuned to the 
rhythm of globalisation. Following the accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), Tunisia was among the first 
wave of Arab countries to join the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) launched in 
1995, and to conclude a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) in 1996. 
While the former envisioned the gradual establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Zone (EMFTZ) by the year 2010, the latter spelt out in detail how to put this into practice 
bilaterally. For Tunisia, the signing of these documents represented a ‘point of no return’.17 
It was clear that the association with Europe would entail both sizeable opportunities and 
momentous challenges for Tunisia (Naboultane 1995; Chourou 1998; Cassarino 1999). On 
the one hand, it threatened to expose Tunisian society to enormous competitive pressures, 
having the potential to endanger large parts of the industrial fabric, destroy a sizeable per-
centage of national income, and lead to profound disruptions at the social level (potentially 
exacerbated by the scheduled phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Agreements in early 2005). 
On the other hand, it promised to reinforce comparative advantages over regional competi-
tors, which might allow it to achieve growth rates higher than in the past, absorb the pro-
jected yearly 80,000 new entrants to the labour market, and compensate for the expected 
mass layoffs in the manufacturing sector (which would mainly concern the large number 
of small import-substituting firms). In principle, Tunisia stood to gain from this: first, be-
                                                 
17 EMAAs are novel ‘third-generation’ agreements that cover all aspects of mutual relations and penetrate 
deeply into the internal affairs of the contracting parties. They contain detailed provisions on how po-
litical cooperation and economic liberalisation are to develop. In doing so, they follow a sequential, dif-
ferential, and asymmetrical approach: Trade liberalisation is obligatory for manufactured goods, with its 
applicability varying between different categories. All tariffs have to be phased out over a 12-year pe-
riod from the date the accord comes into effect. European industrial exports have to be totally exoner-
ated from customs duties by the year 2010 at the very latest. Trade liberalisation for agricultural prod-
ucts, services and public procurement, however, is only tentative, with negotiations beginning five years 
after the ratification of the accord. Any opening of these sectors must be based on the principle of recip-
rocity, taking into account developments within the WTO. Officially, the accord came into effect in 
1998, following its ratification by all EU member states, but Tunisia had begun to implement it unilater-
ally in 1996, in order to underline its commitment to the process. 
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cause the institutional guarantees of the association accord – and the fact that it made the 
opening of markets virtually irreversible – served as a ‘policy anchor’ for the entire reform 
process and simultaneously enhanced the legal security of private investors; second, because 
the asymmetrical dismantling of customs tariffs temporarily reduced factor costs and offered 
extra benefits to private operators; and third, because Tunisia would benefit from the nu-
merous support mechanisms and technical assistance programmes which the EU and other 
international donors promised to put into place.18 
The main benefit which a new-generation FTA like the Euro-Tunisian EMAA offered to 
local firms thus consisted of improved access to three main ‘targets’: first, to a worldwide 
stock of productivity-enhancing knowledge; second, to foreign intermediate and capital 
goods; and third, to foreign factor and consumer markets. All of this was supposed to sup-
port the creation of new sources of national income; accelerate the inward transfer of 
modern technological and organisational know-how; intensify the necessary development 
of further downstream and upstream activities; and thereby contribute to the stabilisation 
of the country’s balance of payment. The authors of a recent study on the association proc-
ess have thus correctly concluded that “since Tunisia stands to gain limited additional ac-
cess for its exports to the EU, except for a few agricultural products, the expected growth 
of exports will result mostly from a re-allocation of resources from import-substituting 
production to export industries, increased investment in these industries, and productivity 
gains” (Bchir / Chemingui / Hammouda 2009, 132f.). This is precisely what the architects 
of this process seem to have had in mind from the beginning. 
The third phase is still ongoing. It is mainly concerned with managing the consequences of 
the above decisions. Ben Ali’s apparent aim is to develop a politically sustainable order 
that will allow him to integrate emerging social forces, without relinquishing ultimate po-
litical control. His preferred strategy has been a controlled pluralism in the parliamentary 
sphere. Since 1994, ‘cooperative’ opposition parties have been offered a growing share of 
the available seats in the assembly system (rising to 25 percent in October 2009), and 
since 2004, opposition candidates have also been admitted to presidential elections (which 
is a real ‘first’ in Tunisian history). This strategy has been complemented by the estab-
lishment of all kinds of consultative bodies and quota systems for groups underrepresented 
within the official sphere. A landmark of this system reconfiguration was the successful 
‘deconstruction’ of the succession issue. A public referendum launched in 2002 abolished 
the constitutional restrictions which Ben Ali himself had introduced after his coup, and 
which would have prevented him from standing for another term. The amended constitu-
tion no longer puts a limit on the number of presidential terms, and only maintains an age 
limit of 75 years for eligible candidates. Unsurprisingly, Ben Ali was re-elected in 2004 
and 2009, albeit this time with ‘only’ 94.59 percent and 89.62 percent of the votes. 
Ben Ali’s ‘New Tunisia’ actually features a peculiar mix of change and continuity. On the 
one hand, there are clearly many similarities between both political eras. Supreme control 
                                                 
18 Feasibility studies commissioned by the Tunisian authorities around that time distinguished between 
three groups of local enterprises: one third was already fit for the world market and would not need fur-
ther assistance; another third would stand a real chance of facing up to international competition if given 
time and support; and a last third would not have no chance of coping with free trade, no matter what 
happened (Naboultane 1995). It must be noted that the Tunisian economy still enjoyed a high level of 
effective protection by that time, with an average customs rate of 43 percent, plus quantitative restric-
tions on many products. 
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of political decision making continues to be vested in the same old ‘power triangle’ of 
Bourguibist times, made up of state, party, and presidency. As before, leading positions 
within state institutions are reserved for party members, while leading positions within 
party structures are occupied by government officials. And, also like before, the ruling 
party is expected to defend government policies, in the same way as the state bureaucracy 
is supposed to implement the Destourian ideology. Thus, Tunisia has on all accounts re-
mained a party-state, in the same way as the RCD has remained the state-party – if not de 
iure, then at least de facto. Crucially, this complex is still wholly dominated by the presi-
dency. As before, Ben Ali is not only at once the head of state and of government, but also 
the chairman of the ruling party and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In addi-
tion, he also assumed the chairmanship of the new constitutional council. Thus, the Tuni-
sian Republic in many respects continues to resemble a ‘secular monarchy’ – once again if 
not by name, then in fact. Unlike other countries in the region, Tunisia is still not heading 
for a stronger differentiation or decentralisation of political functions and powers. 
This means that regular, substantial influence on strategic political issues is still restricted 
to a very small circle of top decision makers, who control the upper echelons and the key 
institutions of the central state and the ruling party. Essentially recruited via the Destour 
and clustering around the presidency, they continue to control the levers of power and 
determine the grand lines of public policy. Deliberative institutions, such as the Chamber 
of Deputies (the ‘Lower House’), or the Chamber of Advisers (the ‘Upper House’), only 
play a minor role. Even though most regime institutions (including the ruling party itself) 
have become somewhat more heterogeneous and more representative since the ‘Change’, 
this has not included the effective, comprehensive, or irreversible institutionalisation of 
peaceful, open-ended, and free-wheeling competition among different political formations 
for supreme political power. Nor has it entailed the institutionalisation of government ac-
countability vis-à-vis the preferences of the majority of the population through the ballot 
box. The system which has resulted from this is reasonably inclusive on the distributive 
(‘output’) side, but still relatively exclusive on the participatory (‘input’) side (cf. also World 
Bank 2003a). This means that in spite of all the changes that have taken place since 1987, 
Benalist Tunisia continues to exhibit essential characteristics of an authoritarian system. 
At the same time, however, it is clear that the country has indeed witnessed profound 
changes since Nov. 1987: It has experienced an almost complete renewal of its ruling po-
litical alliance, a far-reaching rebuilding of its economic system, and a substantial recon-
figuration of its political order. This process has not only entailed the comprehensive ex-
change of all those occupying leadership positions in the party-state, it has also resulted in 
an in-depth reshuffling of the societal coalition which used to underpin the latter. All of 
this has profoundly altered both the power relations and working relations between all 
groups and institutions that make up the political system of the ‘New Tunisia’. It has also 
redefined ascribed socio-political functions and roles, affected well-established circulation 
and interaction patterns, and modified both intra-elite and state-society relationships. This 
process has not only created new avenues and opportunities for socio-economic advance-
ment and participation at the level of society as a whole, it has also widened the availabil-
ity of, and access to, power and influence at the level of the party-state itself. 
These changes have not been without consequences; they have not simply reproduced but 
transcended the status quo ante. The reforms which the new ruling elites have enacted 
have not only seriously affected the overall power relations among the main political ac-
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tors, they have also substantially modified the ‘source code’ of Tunisian politics. They 
have not only altered the basic rules which had previously characterised the political 
game, and the main intervening variables which determined decision making, they have 
also changed the social coalition the regime is based upon, and the political contract link-
ing it to the people. At the same time, these changes have increased the overall number of 
politically relevant actors, and diversified the power resources available to them. They 
have not only created new forms of political socialisation and representation within the 
regime, but have also offered new channels of revenue generation and upward mobility to 
the citizens. In doing so, they have affected both the nature and the exercise of authority 
and legitimacy in the country. All of these arguments shall support my hypothesis that the 
Ben Ali Regime substantially differs from its Bourguibist predecessor, and represents a 
qualitatively new form of political rule. 
A threefold power shift has occurred within the ruling political elite: The most important 
change has been the further presidentialisation of political decision making. On the one 
hand, Ben Ali has maintained direct control over all the institutions which still dominate 
policy making, the state bureaucracy and the ruling party in particular. At the same time, 
he has created the new power structure of a full-fledged presidential makhzen which asso-
ciates a professional palace administration, an expansive security apparatus, as well as an 
extended clientelist network clustered around the presidential family itself. The constituent 
elements of this new power structure have gradually become a new ‘shadow elite’ along-
side the formal party-state elites, and are increasingly representing the inner circle (or hard 
core) of the ruling coalition. Of course, this is not at all to say that the Destour or state 
bureaucracy have lost all power and influence. As we shall see, Ben Ali would find it im-
possible to rule the country (or just maintain himself in power) without their help. And yet 
it is true that both have become the instruments rather than being the centres of power; 
they are no longer the prime ‘movers and shakers’, but rather ‘implementers and amplifi-
ers’ of decisions taken by the president and those around him.19 
This has allowed Ben Ali to gain direct personal control over crucial power resources 
which include the managerial skills of a modern palace bureaucracy, the dissuasive ‘push’ 
of a large and loyal security apparatus, and the persuasive ‘pull’ of an equally substantial 
and largely uncontrolled presidential ‘shadow’ budget. At the same time, it has allowed 
him to build up direct, personal links to key social actors, which include the country’s 
‘grand old families’, its emerging business elites, and its new technical intelligentsia. This 
means that he has concentrated enough administrative, ‘coercive’, and ‘co-optative’ ca-
pacities around the presidential palace to be able to formulate, impose, and enforce public 
policies from there. And he has brought enough financial and symbolical resources under 
his personal control to be able to craft his own clientelist networks independent of the 
party-state. Ben Ali’s regime is thus characterised by a hub-and-spokes structure which 
makes him the undisputed axle of the political system. All command chains in the Tuni-
                                                 
19 It must be recalled in this context that the actual centralisation of the decision making process (and 
hence the possibility of Tunisians to participate in it) can vary widely from time to time and from issue 
to issue: This means that not only membership in the ruling elites is shifting, but also access to politi-
cal power as such. While actual participation can be severely restricted in some cases (e.g. with re-
gard to internal or security affairs), it may be more open in others (e.g. with regard to social or eco-
nomic policy). Here, political executives and business representatives are indeed often able to provide 
input, and to influence the outcome of decisions. 
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sian state emanate from the president and converge toward him. This strategic position 
increases his discretionary powers. He can either use his ties to the private sector (and con-
trol over the state budget) to sideline state institutions, or he can use his control of state 
institutions (and the ambiguity of the existing legislation) to rein in the private sector. 
This far-reaching restructuring of the regime institutions has been accompanied by (and 
inter-acted with) an all-encompassing renewal of the political elites. In fact, Ben Ali has 
systematically purged the upper echelons of the party-state, replacing the ‘old guard’ of 
Bourguibists, while propelling his own men into positions of power. In doing so, he has 
both relied upon and departed from established circulation patterns. On the one hand, he 
has continued (and completed) replacing ‘politicians’ with ‘techno-bureaucrats’ and ‘pub-
lic managers’, that is, people who possess special professional experiences and technical 
skills rather than representing specific political agendas or social groups (or, to put it dif-
ferently, experts for ‘outputs’ rather than ‘inputs’). At the same time, he has given prefer-
ence to ‘outsiders’ and ‘newcomers’, that is, people who were previously marginalized or 
excluded from politics, for various reasons. Ben Ali has thus not only maintained, or re-
established, previous mechanisms and channels for elite circulation and upward mobility, 
he has also produced a new system of clientelist networks constituted around people 
whose political breakthrough commenced with the ‘Change’. 
There appear to be two main reasons for why Ben Ali has effectuated such a sweeping 
elite change, and why he has relied on these particular groups: firstly, because he needed 
loyal followers to fend off challengers from both within and without; and secondly, be-
cause he needed capable executives to carry out the reforms needed for economic stabili-
sation and modernisation. The more he came to trade his initially rather abstract political 
legitimacy for more concrete socio-economic promises, the more he had to adjust his style 
of governing. In fact, contrary to a large number of Arab rulers, he does not have exten-
sive natural resources at his disposal, which would provide him with the means to buy 
allegiance or crush contestants at will. Instead, he needs to mobilise resources externally, 
and this pre-supposes both having full access to foreign (Western) political circles and 
factor markets, and having local aides capable of ensuring such inward transfers and 
maximising their potential. In fact, one of the main reasons for the smooth consolidation 
of the Benalist regime is that he has quite deftly combined strategies of elite renewal with 
efforts to ensure social inclusion. Since 1987, the public sector and the ruling party have 
largely been able to resume their former functions as vehicles for national integration and 
upward mobility. In this sense, they continue to represent the main communication sys-
tems and social escalators for ‘ordinary Tunisians’, who may possess ambition and talent, 
but lack funds or social status. 
This shows that Ben Ali has saved the system he ‘inherited’ by changing it ‘from within’. 
He has preserved the basic politico-institutional make up of the old Bourguibo-Destourian 
order, with its politically hegemonic ruling party, a strongly centralised state bureaucracy, 
as well as a state-dominated corporatist complex; while superimposing on these the new 
power structure of a full-fledged presidential makhzen which associates a modern palace 
administration, a formidable security apparatus, and many leading business clans. These 
new elements have allowed him to mobilise and incorporate all those political resources 
which he needed to consolidate and perpetuate his rule.  
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4  Overall guidelines of Tunisia's industrial policy 
In the politico-economic universe of Bourguibo-Destourian Tunisia, the state used to be 
the centrepiece and linchpin of both politics and economics. It was meant to determine not 
only the allocation of resources, but also the distribution of social opportunities. In this 
context, the banking sector used to play a particularly crucial role. Banks, which them-
selves were either owned or controlled by the state, used to administer and distribute the 
lion’s share of national savings. They were not only used for channelling money into pri-
ority sectors, but also served to ‘reward’ politically important groups. By the same token, 
they were charged with covering up the state’s deficit spending, and supply it with fresh 
capital. By the time of the ‘Change’, however, it had become clear that the state had ‘over-
stretched’ itself, was no longer able to perform all of its functions, and would thus be 
forced to cede a part of its powers. It was also clear that the question of how to reform 
such an entity would touch upon the very heart of the existing ‘social contract’, cut deeply 
into the clientelist networks of the ruling elites, and thereby rock the very pillars of the 
political system (Henry 1996; Dillman 1998; Belev 2000). 
The sensitivity of these issues can be gleaned from the sluggish progress of public sector 
reform. It started timidly in the early 1980s with the decision to limit price controls to ‘ba-
sic products’ (even though this decision was only restrictively implemented). It did not, 
however, involve the sale of a single public firm until the late 1980s (except for the rever-
sal of agricultural collectivisation in the late 1960s). Even with the start of the ERSAP, 
this very cautious approach to economic reform was not abandoned: In fact, government 
authorities had made it quite clear from the very beginning that all ‘strategic sectors’ 
should be excluded from the privatisation process. This notion included both utilities (e.g. 
power generation, water supply, public transport) and commodities (e.g. mining, chemi-
cals, steel). This meant that reforms were at that time mainly concerned with stabilisation, 
not restructuring; they stopped at the macro-economic surface, without getting into the 
micro-economic substance. This defensive strategy produced rather unimpressive results, 
as evidenced by the sharp economic slump of the early 1990s. Poor results were not only 
due to the obstinate foot-dragging of powerful vested interests and the deliberate decision 
of the political leadership to keep the economic opening from touching on the system’s 
core; they were also (and maybe even more so) attributable to the aforementioned struc-
tural constraints of the national economy, as well as to several ‘adverse’ developments in 
the international context, that were largely beyond the reach of Tunisian policy makers. 
All of this prompted the new ruling elites around Ben Ali to carry out an in-depth revision 
of their economic policy (Dillman 1998; 2001; Murphy 1999, 2001). This rethink partly 
resulted from, and partly contributed to, the aforementioned elite renewal. A major result 
of this process was a newfound consensus among the ‘inner circle elites’ that economic 
development should be achieved through market forces rather than through state planning, 
and that private businesses rather than the public sector should act as the driving force. An 
increasingly deregulated, predominantly private sector-owned industrial and services sec-
tor should have a key role here. By penetrating global value chains, they should produce 
the inward financial transfers needed for maintaining political stability. This new policy 
opted for a stepped-up integration into the world market, based on the systematic capture 
of new market segments via a deliberate exploitation of one’s comparative advantages. 
Access to foreign export markets and the generation of sustained resource inflows were 
preferably to be pursued through the means of free trade agreements and privileged eco-
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nomic relations with Tunisia’s most important trading partners. The primary outcome of 
this rethink was the decision to transform the highly protected and regulated infitâh econ-
omy into an increasingly open and outward-oriented market economy. 
At first glance, it appears that ‘les hommes du changement’ had fully endorsed the main 
tenets of the ‘open regionalism approach’. The basic idea behind this policy was to build 
up geographically defined political orders and economic clusters, which would consist of 
countries linked to each other by special economic relations and preferential trade agree-
ments, while remaining open to similarly structured entities elsewhere in the world (and to 
the world market at large). The argument put forward to justify this (pro)position was that 
Tunisia was much too small to mobilise large-scale private investment capable of generat-
ing growth rates commensurate with demographic pressures. Only as a part (and possibly 
the hub) of a larger regional market, and of an economically integrated Maghreb, could 
Tunisia justify its labour costs and fully exploit its human capital. The conclusion of the 
proponents of this viewpoint (especially after the failure of the Arab Maghreb Union, 
which was the initially preferred option of the new regime) was that achieving meaningful 
economic growth rates allowing for the maintenance of the socio-political status quo 
would only be feasible through their country’s re-insertion into the global market. The 
most advantageous option (if not the only conceivable one) for their country would lie in 
its sequential association with the Common European Market via the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership initiative launched at the Barcelona Conference in late 1995. 
This in-depth re-definition of the national development strategy had a profound impact on 
the specific role which the state was supposed to perform in this regard. Henceforth, the 
public authorities should limit themselves to providing those goods which the ‘market’ 
could not deliver. These involved ensuring macro-economic stability (low inflation, stable 
interests, realistic exchange rates), providing basic socio-economic services (education, 
health, transport, water, electricity), and establishing an ‘enabling’ legal-institutional 
framework (little bureaucratic interference, secure property rights, effective legal redress). 
Other important functions which the state ought to assume in this equation included main-
taining public order, securing national independence, and promoting social cohesion. The 
state was thus expected to become less important as an ‘actor’ that actively interferes in 
productive life, and arbitrarily determines factor prices, while it was supposed to become 
more important as an ‘arbiter’ that decides on the ‘rules of the game’, and enforces them 
vis-à-vis the rest of the ‘players’. Finally, it was seen as being instrumental for managing 
relations between the ‘social partners’, determining the distribution of the spoils, and en-
suring a peaceful settlement of the conflicts that might arise. This meant a shift from act-
ing as a ‘producer’ and ‘director’ toward becoming more of a ‘manager’ and ‘regulator’. 
Business, in turn, was expected to fill the gap left by the state. Private operators were from 
now on attributed even more importance for achieving the traditional twin goals of eco-
nomic modernisation and industrial development. It would be up to them to ‘innovate’, 
generate economic growth, enhance factor productivity, and provide the additional jobs 
necessary for upholding the regime’s ‘welfarist promise’ of both collective advancement 
and individual improvement. This was not necessarily a change of paradigm, but it cer-
tainly implied an inversion of roles. Before, the state used to (or claimed to) take the lead 
when it came to charting the way forward for the country as a whole, and allocating the 
resources needed for this task – while business was expected to follow in its wake, and fill 
in the niches left by it. This means that the private sector was actually attributed a subor-
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dinate role compared to the public sector. From that point on, it would rather be the other 
way round. Private enterprise was now supposed to act as the main driver for develop-
ment, while the public authorities were called upon to assist it in achieving this task. This 
means that business was expected to become the motor of the economy and a catalyst for 
progress – while the state remained in the driver’s seat and continued to chart the course. 
However, it must be noted that in spite of many regime elites’ apparently rather neo-
classical worldview, they still deviate from the ‘Washington Consensus’ in numerous 
ways. Ben Ali has made it very clear on countless occasions that he regards economic de-
velopment as serving a more comprehensive purpose. Referring to the related chapter of 
the National Pact which stresses that “le développement intégral et équitable est la finalité 
suprême du combat du peuple tunisien et de la politique de l’Etat” (Republic of Tunisia 
1994, 17). For him, the overriding goal of economic policy should be the “edification of 
an open and balanced economy that reconciles economic efficiency with social prosperity” 
(anniversary speech of 7 Nov. 2000). At the end of the day, its main raison d’être is to 
help secure and perpetuate the socio-political contract on which the Bourguibo-Destourian 
state is based and dependent. From this point of view, economic growth and technological 
progress are only desirable insofar and as long as they do not undermine political stability 
or social cohesion. This also means that the state would have to provide for a ‘just distri-
bution of the fruits of growth’ among the ‘different categories of Tunisian society’ – while 
being the one who defines what this actually means in practice. 
It was clear for everybody that the successful implementation of this new strategy would 
not be an easy feat. The state’s pull-out from ‘micro-management’ – together with the 
gradual opening of the domestic market – meant that business would have to take over at 
least a part of the functions which the state used to perform, while simultaneously coping 
with the multiple pressures resulting from the gradual introduction of direct competition 
with foreign businesses. This dual task was likely to be a difficult undertaking given the 
lopsided situation of the private sector. To be sure, the industrialisation process had pro-
gressed considerably by the mid-1990s. Industry’s share of Tunisia’s GDP rose from 11.9 
percent in 1980 to 20.3 percent in 1995, and its share in exports soared from 36 percent in 
1980 to 75 percent in 1995. Between 1992 and 1996 alone, the manufacturing industry 
showed an average annual growth rate of about 20 percent (Englert 1997). However, a 
number of deficits remained, and it was clear that these not only threatened the success of 
the national development strategy, but also the survival of many private firms.20 
The answer of the state authorities consisted of a pro-active support policy that facilitated 
the competitive reconversion of the local manufacturing industry, and managed the poten-
tially negative repercussions of the transformation process. The main starting point for this 
new policy should be the structures put into place under Bourguiba: the light manufactur-
ing industry (primarily textiles, garments, footwear, leather work and, increasingly, me-
chanical and electrical appliances), as well as the services sector (mainly the tourism in-
                                                 
20 These deficits concerned in particular the very small size and the weak capitalisation of many compa-
nies. A 1995 survey found that 60 percent of Tunisian enterprises employed less than 20 workers, and 
only 1.4 percent more than 300. Among the 8552 enterprises registered at that time, 53 percent were 
capitalised at less than TD 50,000, and only 8 percent at over 500,000. Industry was still dominated by 
the textile sector which accounted for almost 50 percent of manufactured exports, and for over 50 per-
cent of industrial jobs (Naboultane 1995). 
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dustry and adjacent sectors).21 Both should follow an approach that would gradually 
broaden the base of production, add further components to the product cycle, help narrow 
existing gaps in the local value chains, and diminish national dependency on foreign in-
puts. Further, by stepping up the quality of the offer, they should help achieve more sig-
nificant returns for the local economy. There were three main reasons for making this 
choice. The first was the overriding importance of these two sectors for the Tunisian 
economy. Taken together, textiles and tourism still accounted for about half of total for-
eign revenues in the early 1990s, with textiles at around 30 percent, and tourism at around 
20 percent. The second reason was the existence of major comparative advantages and 
other enabling factors (such as Tunisia’s reputation for stability, the existence of a cost-
effective workforce, and the availability of a fairly modern infrastructure). The third rea-
son was the availability of certain geopolitical rents and temporary windfalls (including 
their own proximity to Europe, the involuntary market exit of several competitors follow-
ing the breakdown of the Yugoslavian Republic, and the obvious eagerness of Western 
firms to outsource labour-intensive activities to low-cost countries). 
This strategy was further fleshed out in the following years. Several changes were of par-
ticular importance. The first was the subsequent redefinition of the word ‘strategic’, which 
had a profound impact on the actual unfolding of public sector reform. More and more 
presumably ‘strategic’ sectors were opened to private enterprise: including transport, en-
ergy, telecoms, audiovisuals, education and banks. The second major change was the in-
creasing focus on immaterial aspects: on issues like marketing, branding, standardisation, 
certification, quality management, human resources, etc. As the national upgrading pro-
gramme shifted into a higher gear, it became increasingly clear that progress at this level 
would be key to its later success. Improvements in terms of management procedures and 
production processes thus came to be seen as being at least as important as improvements 
at the level of cost-efficiency and product quality itself. The third major change was the 
increasing focus on the services sector: on branches like business consulting, financial 
services, data processing, market research, customer relations, etc. These were not only 
increasingly regarded as constituting crucial variables for industrial upgrading, but also as 
representing potential economic ‘drivers’ in their own right. 
The ICT sector has particularly moved up in the political hierarchy as of late. It is increas-
ingly perceived as constituting a sort of ‘interface’ and ‘missing link’ between Tunisia’s 
education policy on the one hand, and its economic policy on the other, which offers 
promising development perspectives for industrial late-comers. The government clearly 
hopes it will help the country break out of its age-old geo-political predicament as a small, 
peripheral, resource-poor country, and enter straight into the new age of the ‘knowledge 
society’. As a former government member stated: “We are capable of competing with the 
Europeans in sectors which require human skills. This is why we will concentrate on the knowl-
edge society which in addition offers the possibility of rapid development.”22 Thus, ICT have not 
only been identified as an area of high priority for national development, but also as one of 
the priority sectors for public investment.23 
                                                 
21 Surprisingly, traditionally important and employment-intensive sectors like handicrafts, commerce, and agri-
culture were almost completely absent from the regime discourse at that time (and some of them still are). 
22  Fethi Merdassi, quoted in Le Figaro, 04/09/02, 15 
23  Cf. the two Special Dossiers “Tunisie : Le pari de haute technologie”, JA 2268, 27/06/04, 48–68 and 
“Voyage en Cyber-Tunisie”, JA 2317, 05/06/05, 67–95. 
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In 2008, the Tunisian government finally adopted its new industrial strategy ‘Horizon 
2016’, following a long process of reflection and deliberation which was coordinated by 
the Ministry of Industry, Energy and SMEs, and which associated a large number of 
stakeholders (Republic of Tunisia 2009).24 This strategy sought to define the main pa-
rameters which ought to guide Tunisian industrial policy until the year 2016. A major 
premise of ‘Horizon 2016’ has been that competition is set to grow among the participat-
ing countries of the Barcelona Process. This particularly applies to their attempt to attract 
FDI, particularly in the field of high value-added activities. The authors of the study there-
fore conclude that Tunisia will need to define and communicate its comparative advan-
tages much more aggressively and pro-actively vis-à-vis potential target groups at home 
and abroad – especially as its competitors in Europe enjoy considerable advantages at 
various levels. In their eyes, Tunisia would thus be well advised to not only rely on its low 
costs, but to advance ‘qualitative arguments’, such as its political stability, sound business 
environment, well-trained workforce, logistical capacities, and the general quality of life. 
According the authors, in particularly the ‘ability to innovate’ will be a key factor. 
The prime medium-term goal of Tunisian industrial policy, as expressed in Horizon 2016, 
is the creation of an economy that is quality-based, skill-driven, innovation-oriented, and 
knowledge-intensive. Its aim is to position Tunisia as one of the top five regional hubs in 
the wider Mediterranean basin. In doing so, it will not seek to renounce, but rather to capi-
talise on the country’s past success as an industrial ‘back office’ and ‘near-shore’ for for-
eign, mainly European, companies. In this context, Tunisia shall attempt to become a re-
gionally and globally connected commercial hub and production site which is capable of 
providing both vertically and horizontally integrated industrial and commercial operations 
and services for foreign (and chiefly European) customers and investors. As the authors of 
the study conclude: “By catering to what investors are looking for, Tunisia can put itself 
ahead of competitors, standing out from who it is in ‘cost’ competition with, and position-
ing itself as a more developed country” (Republic of Tunisia 2009, 19). 
According to the architects of this new strategy, Tunisian industrial policy will build on 
four main components: growth, quality, diversification, and cross-fertilisation. The de-
clared objective is to double exports and triple investment between 2008 and 2016: from 
TD 15 to 30 billion and from TD 1 to 3 billion, respectively.25 These quantitative 
achievements are to be accompanied by qualitative improvements. This means that Tuni-
sians shall move beyond traditional sectors (such as textiles & clothing, leather & foot-
wear, agribusiness, mechanical & electrical industries, building materials, phosphate 
chemical industries) and specifically target more sophisticated sectors with a higher added 
value (such as electronic industries, automotive & aeronautics industries, technical plas-
tics, pharmaceutical & paramedical industries, ICTs & service centres). In this way, a new 
generation of firms emerging in a new set of sectors will complete the make-up of the na-
tional economy, and result in a fruitful cross-over between various sectors. The goal is to 
                                                 
24 The strategy is based on a study which was drawn up at the behest of the MIEPME by a team of experts, 
(three internationals, two Tunisians) under the supervision of the API and with the support of the PMI. 
The work of these experts was monitored by a steering committee chaired by the UTICA. 
25 Horizon 2016 expects IMEE activities to have the highest growth, accounting for 46 percent of indus-
trial exports in 2016, up from 25 percent in 2006. They are also projected to have the highest growth 
rates with regard to investment, followed closely by the phosphate chemical industries and construction 
materials. 
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raise the average annual growth rate from 5 to 6 percent between 2008 and 2016, mainly 
by promoting know-how-intensive sectors and thereby raising total factor productivity. 
Five countries that have been particularly successful at attracting a large amount of foreign 
investment are said to be Tunisia’s main sources of inspiration: namely the Czech Repub-
lic, Morocco, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Turkey. All of these are presented as hav-
ing excelled in various ways: the Czech Republic in the field of cluster development and 
international matchmaking; Morocco with regard to external communication and regional 
development; the Netherlands thanks to its logistics and trade infrastructure; Singapore in 
terms of human development and training; and Turkey as a dynamic producer and ex-
porter. All of them are said to have opted for a limited number of ‘best practice’ elements, 
that include the focus on clear priorities and target sectors with a high added value and 
return component; the clustering of priorities and activities according to their respective 
strengths and advantages; the adoption of pro-active commercial and industrial strategies 
with a strong external promotion and networking component; and finally, the achievement 
of a high degree of global visibility and economic integration. The fact that these policies 
have been adopted at the highest level of the state is said to have generated a surplus of 
credibility, which has further facilitated the realisation of their goals. 
5  Key strategic elements of Tunisia's industrial policy 
Institutional and administrative framework 
According to official sources, one of the main concerns of state policy has been to create 
an ‘enabling’ institutional environment that encourages private entrepreneurship. During 
the first phase of the ERSAP, a raft of measures were passed that were meant to limit bu-
reaucratic interference with business affairs, reduce political hazards for private operators, 
and help unlock the growth potential of the national economy. Reform policies clustered 
around three pillars. The first one was about rehabilitating financial stability and reducing 
inflationary pressures, mainly by cutting back on public expenses and tightening money 
supply. The second one aimed to deregulate market access and facilitate foreign trade, by 
easing or lifting import restrictions and licensing practices. The third one aimed to en-
hance market mechanisms and reduce price distortions.26 During the second phase of the 
ERSAP, the government systematically passed legislation that aimed to enhance ‘the ease 
of doing business’, persuade private investors to assume a more active role, and lure for-
eign capital into the country. This was accompanied by substantial changes at the institu-
tional level. Alongside the establishment of two new bodies tasked with promoting private 
investment in industry and agriculture (FIPA and APIA respectively), these concerned the 
overhaul of the existing agencies in industry and export (namely API and CEPEX). 
In 1992, a new law on off-shore free-trade zones was passed, which offered exporting 
companies numerous benefits. These included a very attractive legal and fiscal framework 
(providing inter alia a multi-year tax exemption and duty-free imports of components), in 
                                                 
26 By the end of 1994, the overwhelming majority of domestic prices had become ‘untied’, except for a 
small number of basic products (such as bread, milk, oil, sugar, paper, etc.) that continued to be state-
administered. 
Steffen Erdle 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 24 
addition to substantial technical and financial assistance from the state (including free ba-
sic infrastructure and partial reimbursement of investment costs).27 In 1994, the new ‘code 
d'incitations aux investissements’ entered into force. Unifying existing legislation in this 
field, it covered nearly the entire range of economic activities, and provided for a consid-
erable simplification of administrative procedures.28 Henceforth, new firms set up on Tu-
nisian soil would benefit from special customs duties or tax rates for imported or locally 
purchased goods and inputs. Further, it was now possible to deduct re-invested income or 
profits for up to 35 percent of taxable net income or profits. Importantly, from now on, 
foreign investors could freely dispose of their capital, moving it in or out of the country at 
any time and for any reason (while resident companies had to repatriate their profits).29 
Particularly lush incentives are available for certain priority sectors: A very privileged 
treatment has been reserved for ‘fully exporting companies’, especially when established 
off-shore. A ‘light version’ is available for ‘partially exporting companies’.30 They enjoy 
complete exemption from corporate (profit) or personal (income) taxes over a period of 
ten years, followed by a 50 percent bonus for another ten years. Further, the state grants 
duty-free access to all inputs and equipments, plus full tax deduction for re-invested prof-
its or incomes. Finally, the state provides the infrastructure necessary for the realisation of 
the project, and assumes the employers’ contributions for all local employees to the Caisse 
nationale de compensation sociale (CNCS) over a five-year period. Special incentives are 
also provided for private investments concerning other priority fields, such as ‘regional’ 
and ‘agricultural development’. In the case of the former, the state assumes 15–30 percent 
of total project costs, plus 50–75 percent of related infrastructure costs (in addition to 
largely the same benefits as those available to export-only companies), depending on how 
far the investment is located from the coast. In the case of the latter, the state offers a 
seven-percent bonus, and a ten-year tax holiday (plus additional tax breaks for re-invested 
profits, and preferential VAT/customs rates for project-related equipment costs).31 
It must be noted, however, that private investment in many sectors is still dependent on the 
express authorisation of the public authorities. This applies in particular to all those sec-
tors which are regarded as politically ‘relevant’ or otherwise ‘sensitive’ (e.g. construction, 
infrastructure, transport, communication, culture, education, publishing, and food process-
ing). The same rule applies to a majority takeover of a local company by a foreign investor 
(as has occurred recently with regard to a number of banks). By the same token, those four 
sectors that can be suspected to be of particular interest to potential investors (and which 
have indeed attracted large quantities of FDI as of late) are still exempt from the single 
investment code and governed by special regulations. These are the mining, energy, com-
                                                 
27 The first two zones, located in Bizerte (north of Tunis) and Zarzis (south of Sfax), were inaugurated two 
years later. They are still operational by the time of writing. 
28 The investment code was complemented by the presidential decree 94-492, itself modified by the de-
crees 97-503 of 1997 and 2000-821 of 2000. 
29 Companies are considered non-resident when at least two thirds of their equity has been imported (also 
allowing them to open convertible currency accounts without prior authorisation). 
30 Theoretically, export-only companies can now sell up to 30 percent of their total production on the local 
market (up from previously 20 percent). However, the large number of ‘special qualifications’ made 
clear that this should remain the exception rather than becoming the rule. 
31 Special conditions are also available for private investments in other fields, namely those concerning 
SMEs, start ups, and other priority sectors, such as health care, childcare, education, professional train-
ing, youth entertainment, leisure parks, cyber parks, and business incubators. 
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mercial, and financial sectors. There are private (foreign) businesses being active in these 
four sectors, but they are only allowed to do so for a transitory period, and under special 
conditions. With the exception of the foreign banks now operating in the financial sector, 
permissions have generally been given on a concessionary basis or under a PPP regime, 
which means that the state remains in full control of the associated risks.32 
Broadly speaking, the privatisation process has passed through three phases since 1987: 
The first phase (1987–94) predominantly concerned small and failing enterprises in the 
tourism, trading, fishing, and agro-foods sectors. The operations were mostly realised in 
the form of sales of assets, which generally entailed splitting up the companies concerned 
into various operating units. The second phase (1994–98) also concerned larger and prof-
itable enterprises, e.g. in the manufacturing and transport sectors. Operations were now 
mainly carried out through the sale of blocks of controlling shares based on tender offers 
and/or public offers, following the promulgation of the corresponding law in August 1994. 
The third phase, in force since 1998, has allowed for the inclusion in the privatisation pro-
gramme of quite large, employment-intensive companies in previously closed and dis-
tinctly strategic sectors. This has also involved regular recourse to international investment 
banks and consulting firms, and to more elaborate techniques, e.g. concessions. Altogether 
217 companies (worth TD 6059 million) have been divested between 1987–2008.33 
In addition to this, the government has further fine-tuned its arsenal of support tools. 
Measures include broadening the financial guarantee lines within the state’s main support 
instrument (the Fonds de promotion et de développement industrielle, or FOPRODI); the 
creation of a new fund for supporting upgrading processes in the industrial sector (the 
Fonds de développement de la compétitivité industrielle, or FODEC); as well as launching 
a new fund for helping exporters access foreign markets (the Fonds d’accès aux marchés 
d’exportation, or FAMEX).34 Other measures involve the creation of a special risk fund 
component for business start-ups, which is managed by commercial banks and co-funded 
from the state budget, as well as the creation of a special investment bank for SMEs (the 
BFPME), which provides low-interest loans in the credit range of TD 100,000–5,000,000. 
It must be noted, however, that there is still no indigenous investment bank to finance 
large-scale projects in the fields of industry and infrastructure; for these, Tunisia still has 
to rely on funding from abroad.35 
Another important novelty has been the gradual creation of an institutional framework that 
is more conducive to the launch of new businesses. Thus, new ‘one-stop shops’ (‘guichets 
uniques’) have been set up all over the country in order to provide all the services an in-
vestor needs to carry out his project. This now involves a simple declaration of intent pre-
                                                 
32 It is important to note that the Tunisian government has generally preferred to follow a BOT model 
(‘build-operate-transfer’) rather than a BOO model (‘build-operate-own’). 
33 The takeover of a 35 percent share of Tunisie Télécom by Dubai’s ‘Tecom’ corporation in 2006 (for the 
equivalent of € 1.8 billion) represents half of the total income from the privatisation process. More in-
formation can be found at www.privatization.gov.tn. 
34 The undisputed ‘flagship’ of this policy, namely the Industrial Upgrading Programme (PMN) launched 
in the mid-1990s, will be described in more detail in a separate chapter below. 
35 The other public credit mechanisms – those which are mainly tasked with providing micro-credits for 
start-ups – will be described in more detail in the following chapter. 
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sented to the authority in charge, which will then assume the follow-up of the project.36 
These have been complemented by the successive creation of further support structures, 
which are tasked with helping prospective entrepreneurs set up their companies. These 
include, first, the creation of ‘business centres’ in all of the provincial capitals, which are 
mainly targeted at local start-ups and micro-enterprises; second, the creation of ‘regional 
development offices’ and ‘investment societies’ which are mainly charged with supporting 
the socio-economic development of the interior provinces; and third, the creation of 
‘espaces d'entreprendre’ within the national employment agency ANETI, which are sup-
posed to help the jobless set up their own business. An important role is also played by the 
Technical Centres which have been set up since the 1970s in the country’s main economic 
hubs, and which provide vital technical services to private industrial companies.37 
The creation of industrial zones plays a fundamental role for Tunisia’s industrial policy. 
From 1973 (date of its creation) until 2006, Tunisia’s Industrial Land Agency (Agence 
Foncière Industrielle, AFI) has overseen the launch of 83 industrial zones (ZI) (with a 
total area of 2434 ha): According to figures provided by the MIEPME and GTZ’s Re-
CapZI Project (Renforcement des Capacités de Gestion Durable des Zones Industrielles), 
53 of these are situated in the capital and coastal areas, and 30 are located in the Western 
and Southern provinces. In 2004, another 37 ZI (with a total area of 1390 ha) had been set 
up by sub-national authorities. Importantly, there are still very few ZI built and/or man-
aged by private investors. According to official figures, there are altogether 122 ZI on Tu-
nisian soil at the time of writing: Of these, however, only 17 appear to be fully opera-
tional, some 30 seem to be at least partially operational, and the rest is reported to only 
exist on paper. In spite of important improvements in recent years, only a small fraction of 
Tunisia’s industrial zones operate according to approved international standards (espe-
cially in terms of waste management and environmental protection), and almost half of 
them still have no special management or maintenance structures.38 
In order to facilitate and accelerate the emergence of more integrated and developed busi-
ness clusters on a local and regional level, the government has declared its intention to 
support the country-wide launch of Pôles de compétitivité (PCs) (partially following the 
French model in this regard). PCs are supposed to bring together the three fields of train-
ing, research, and production. To this end, they aim to create an integrated framework 
helping to connect private companies in the business services and manufacturing sector, 
representatives of higher education and applied research institutes, and industrial support 
structures and training institutions. PCs are supposed to support innovation processes at 
the business level, foster the international competitiveness of Tunisian industry and pro-
mote foreign inward investment in Tunisian industry. Under the guidance of the MIEPME 
                                                 
36 These are the API (Industrial Promotion Agency) for investments in industry or services, the APIA 
(Agricultural Investment Promotion Agency) for agriculture, the ONTT (National Tourist Office) for 
tourism, and the ETAP (Tunisian Enterprise for Petroleum Activities) for the energy sector. 
37 Related support structures, such as technopôles, business incubators (pépinières d’entreprises) and 
French-style business clusters (pôles de compétitivité), will be described in more details in the following 
paragraphs. 
38 Only 68 ZI have so far a special management unit, responsible for maintaining the area, which not only 
includes the management and rehabilitation of the infrastructure and buildings, but also the collection 
and treatment of solid waste and waste water. Note that industrial zones involve heavy follow-up costs, 
as the entire infrastructure needs to be replaced after a relatively short time because of pollution and de-
preciation. 
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and the MES, each PC will be run by one of the country’s large firms and dedicated to a 
specific sector: Sousse (Amen Bank/Tunisie Leasing) will focus on mechanical, electrical, 
and electronical industries; Bizerte (Banque de Tunisie) and Monastir (BIAT) on textile 
and garment industries; Sfax (Postes de Tunisie) on information and communication tech-
nologies; while Gafsa (Mines de Gafsa) will be open to all sectors.39 
Compared to the situation a few decades ago, and some deficiencies notwithstanding, pri-
vate investors and company owners are now facing a significantly more coherent and effi-
cient legal-institutional framework, including a substantially better performing and more 
targeted technical and financial support base. At the same time, however, they are still 
confronted with a large number of special safeguard clauses and legal exceptions creating 
legal frictions and confusion. On the one hand, this has given the public authorities more 
discretion and flexibility when it comes to dealing with requests and complaints from the 
private sector. On the other hand, it has added to the complexity and opaqueness of the 
business framework, which is in itself not particularly conducive to the workings and suc-
cess of private enterprise. Moreover, all of this has contributed to creating a large number 
of incentives and opportunities for ‘political capture’ and ‘rent seeking’, i.e. to non-
productive and discriminatory arrangements and practices which more often than not work 
both ways; they may lead to the harassing and bullying of businesses by the state, but can 
also result in the fleecing and blackmailing of the state by business.40 
Economic and social infrastructure 
The state authorities were also fully aware at an early time that the country’s physical and 
non-physical infrastructure – and particularly its communication, transport, education and 
vocational training sectors – would have to be upgraded if their bid for competitiveness 
was to be successful. Hence, they began to devise new (mixed) financing mechanisms for 
large-scale infrastructure investments, in order to lure private money into related projects. 
There has so far been a clear focus on transport and energy, with budgetary allocations 
being substantially increased since the 1990s. As a result, Tunisia’s physical infrastructure 
is generally in a good state. There are altogether six commercial sea ports and eight inter-
national airports; the national road system is fairly developed (the railway system less so); 
and all of them are currently undergoing modernisation and extension. Important projects 
underway or in the pipeline include the construction of a major new airport and deepwater 
port complex at Enfidha (east of Tunis); the extension of the national highway system 
(westbound to Algeria, southbound to Libya); and finally the installation of major new 
power generation capacities all over the country. It must be noted that Tunisia’s very lim-
ited fossil assets force policy makers to make the most of existing resources in order to 
cover the growing energy demand of the country’s quickly growing manufacturing indus-
try and its consumption-hungry middle classes. Significant investments are currently being 
                                                 
39 Importantly, the managing authority will not only be entrusted with the management and maintenance 
of the PC, but also with its marketing and advertising. 
40 Several of my interlocutors have pointed out that the Tunisian state has tended to become entrapped by 
its own incentives, in the sense that businessmen have become so ‘addicted’ to these ‘carrots’ that they 
refuse to budge unless they are provided with ‘input’ from ‘above’. 
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injected into this sector and major new production facilities will come on-stream soon; 
PPP contracts with foreign companies have played a key role in this regard.41 
Another focus has been on information and communications, which both have undergone 
a significant overhaul since the 1990s. After a relatively late start, rising demands for mo-
bile lines rapidly exceeded the supply capacities of the only public provider, Tunisie Télé-
com (TT). Thus, it was decided to admit a private provider into the telecom business and, 
in 2002, the license was awarded to Tunisiana, a joint venture of Egypt’s Orascom and 
Kuwait’s Wataniyya. As a result, prices have fallen, and coverage has increased. Penetra-
tion rates have risen from 15 percent in 2001 to 99.9 percent in 2007. At the same time, 
the availability and quality of internet connections and online services have also improved. 
The number of subscribers has risen from 30.000 in 1999 to 253.000 in 2007, while the 
number of users is estimated at 1.7 million. The state has encouraged this trend by offering 
financial incentives for purchasing personal computers and by creating a country-wide 
network of subsidised internet shops for less affluent citizens (publinets). This means that 
in spite of some problems, the ICT sector is no longer the national ‘bottleneck’ it used to 
be only a decade ago; it has rather become a driving force for economic development.42 
A clear key role has been reserved for education and training. In fact, the entire sector has 
undergone major changes since the early 1990s, which have all greatly modified the pa-
rameters and opportunities for skill generation and social mobility: The government has 
not only significantly increased its allocations to this sector, but has also greatly broad-
ened its accessibility to citizens. Today, education facilities (including those for higher 
learning and professional training) have become available across the nation. The sector 
receives almost 30 percent of the state budget (the equivalent of 7.5 percent of GDP), 
which may also explain why Tunisia has become a regional frontrunner in this policy 
field. Overall, literacy rose from 65 percent in 1990 to 79 percent in 2006. Current enrol-
ment rates stand at 97 percent for primary education, 75 percent for secondary education, 
and 25 percent for tertiary education. The number of students has risen tenfold since the 
‘Change’: from about 40,000 in 1986/87 to almost 400,000 in 2009/10. The number of 
diplômés has equally seen significant increases over time. Of the currently annually 
90,000 newcomers to the national labour market, at least 50,000 have a high school cer-
tificate – and their number is expected to grow further in the future.43 
At the same time, however, it must be noted that these reforms have not been able to do 
away with a certain number of structural problems facing the country’s education system: 
First, Tunisian universities still fail to produce sufficiently large numbers of high-quality 
graduates in science and technology; 60 percent of their students are still enrolled in lib-
eral arts, social sciences, law, or economics, which is more than the labour market can 
actually absorb in the foreseeable future. Second, public policy is still almost exclusively 
focused on teaching, with research being neglected. Likewise, expenditure has been di-
rected mostly at the improvement of facilities and equipment, while the upgrading of cur-
                                                 
41  Abdelaziz Barouhi “Soif d’énergie”, JA 2282, 03/10/04, 40–41 
42  Jean-Philippe von Gastrow “Le pari ‘high-tech’”, JA 2278, 05/09/04, 59–60 
43 370.000 students (over half of whom are women) are currently enrolled in one of the 190 institutions of 
higher learning in the country (which include 13 universities). This means that the share of young Tuni-
sians (18–24 years) receiving a higher education has risen from 7.5 percent in the early 1980s to 25 per-
cent at present. Further data can be found at www.mes.tn. 
Industrial policy in Tunisia 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 29
ricula and teaching staff has relatively been neglected. This, however, is incompatible with 
the envisaged qualitative breakthrough in economic life. Third, Tunisian universities still 
often fail to provide their students with the skills needed to succeed in the labour market.  
Measures enacted by the government with the aim of addressing these deficiencies include 
a growing focus on the creation of applied research and vocational training schemes on the 
one hand, and a growing concern with the promotion of knowledge-based and skill-
intensive employment opportunities on the other. The most important steps in this regard 
have been the creation of a country-wide network of Instituts supérieurs d’enseignement 
technique (ISET) and Centres de formation (CF), which are supposed to produce the ur-
gently needed technicians and skilled workers for the country’s growing manufacturing 
and crafts sectors; plus the creation of ‘techno-cities’ and business incubators (Technopôles 
and Pepinières d'entreprises) at the level of universities, which are supposed to bridge the 
gap between economic production, applied research, and higher education, to provide a pro-
pitious framework for a new generation of ‘hi-tech’ start-ups, and to lay the foundations for 
the next stage of industrial development, based on the principle of innovation.44 
At the same time, the government has created a vast array of support schemes and incen-
tive structures to encourage private firms to employ young people and thereby reduce so-
cial tensions. Among them are special traineeship programmes for university students 
(Stages d'insertion à la vie professionnelle), unemployed graduates (Programmes de for-
mation complémentaire), young non-academics (Programmes d'insertion et d'attestation 
professionnelle) as well as for redundant workers (Programmes de réinsertion profession-
nelle). Additionally to these, there are programmes dedicated to supporting start-ups as 
well as programmes at the disposal of the regions. This means that private companies em-
ploying university graduates will get more than 50 percent of their additional costs reim-
bursed from the state budget, and this for a period of one year. The aim of this policy is 
quite clear: it consists of creating as many employment opportunities for qualified young 
people as possible – coûte que coûte. This leads us to the next issue, which – from the per-
spective of the government – is not only absolutely crucial for the maintenance of political 
stability, but also for the success of its industrial policy as such. 
Social and labour policy 
When designing and implementing the above policies, the ruling elites have been careful 
to not only stay in control of the process of change, but also to cushion their impact on 
society. A case-in-point is the hesitant reform of the labour code. Adopted in 1966, it spelt 
out the general provisions for industrial relations.45 As a general rule, employees received 
                                                 
44 Government plans foresee the establishment of 24 technopôles, one for each governorate. Each tech-
nopôle shall concentrate on a specific sector. Only one, however, is fully operational at the time of writ-
ing, namely ‘El-Ghazala’ in Tunis-Ariana (ICT, founded in 1999). Seven more are currently under con-
struction: in El Fejja-Manouba and Monastir (ITH); Sidi Thabet (pharmaceuticals, biotechnology); Borj 
Cedria (vegetable biotechnology, renewable energy); Sousse (IMEE); Safx (ICT); and Bizerte (IAA). 
Others are still at the planning stage: in Ennahli and Manouba (ICT); Medenine; and Jendouba. How-
ever, only ‘El-Ghazala’ with its 82 companies has so far managed to attract noticeable amounts of pri-
vate investment (cf. Abdelaziz Barrouhi “Frénésie de technopôles”, JA 2544, 11/10/09, 75–76 for more 
information in this regard). 
45 For instance, it allowed workers to organise in any firm above a certain size (usually in ‘industrial 
firms’ with more than 20 employees), although these provisions were not enforced until the 1970s. 
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life-time contracts which employers could only revoke for two reasons: when their firm 
was in economic difficulties, or when an employee had committed a serious offense. For 
employers to lay off employees, they needed the authorisation of both the ministry of so-
cial affairs, and the general labour inspectorate. This process normally proved lengthy and 
costly for businesses, as officials tended to side with the employees.46 In 1972/73, the la-
bour code was complemented by the newly created ‘collective framework conventions’. 
Negotiated every few years between the ‘social partners’ (i.e. the government, the labour 
union UGTT, and the business federation UTICA), the conventions laid down basic rules 
applicable to the entire economy, including minimum wages, working hours, and pay 
rises. On the basis of these accords, the ‘social partners’ would then conclude sectoral ac-
cords detailing pay scales, working rules, and other rights and duties for workers and 
owners in that sector. The only real novelty was collective wage bargaining, i.e. abandon-
ing the monopoly of the state in determining the level of wages. 
The main reason why this system ran into trouble over time was the growing discrepancy 
between theory and practice or, to put it another way, between the official rules and their 
actual application. Labour laws were rarely fully enacted in the private sector because 
most units were very small and fell under the minimum threshold established by the la-
bour code. Moreover, many employers tended to regard their firms (and those working in 
them) as their private property. Furthermore, the labour code had not been updated for 
many years, and its provisions had thus become totally outdated. The parties involved 
were clearly interested in keeping labour legislation as vague (and as flexible) as possible. 
This situation, however, had changed by the early 1990s in that the same parties were now 
lobbying for a revision of the code. The UTICA was pressing for its liberalisation to allow 
them to adjust their workforce to the growing market fluctuations. The UGTT was press-
ing for its clarification to help them gain a better foothold in the private sector. The gov-
ernment itself was increasingly sympathetic to these demands, but not willing to make a 
move before the crisis was over. This was the case in 1992. 
Labour code reforms were enacted in two rounds: first, by Law 94-29 of February 1994, 
and then, by Law 96-62 of July 1996 (cf. Alexander 2000; 2001 for further details). The 
most important provisions of law 94-29 were to streamline the diverse plant committees 
into a single commission consultative for all firms with more than 40 employees, and to 
provide for a more precise definition of a ‘serious offense’ (even though the latter would 
still remain quite pervasive). The most important provisions of law 96-62 were to broaden 
the list of cases where employers could hire workers under fixed-term contracts, while 
narrowing down the list of clauses under which employers could fire them due to ‘eco-
nomic difficulties’. Henceforth, employee performance was to play a role in determining 
wage levels, and employers gained more leeway for the internal organisation of working 
processes.47 Labour code reforms thus once again confirmed some typical features of the 
                                                 
46 In order to lay off workers, employers had to obtain the approval of a commission (presided over by the 
ministry of social affairs) which normally worked to prevent dismissals. If it consented, employers were 
often taken to court by union representatives who tried to extract hefty indemnities for dismissed work-
ers. The labour code provided some ‘back doors’ for short-term contracts but the extensive obligations 
involved clearly indicated that these were supposed to remain the exception rather than becoming the 
rule. 
47 Similar amendments were made to the collective convention system; the institution of tri-annual nego-
tiations under the supervision of the ministry of social affairs was maintained, but the leeway of sectoral 
negotiators to deviate from the provisions of the general accords was broadened. 
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Tunisian reform process. Despite the collective interests and advocacy activities of ‘social 
partners’, both the timing, and the outcome of the reforms were essentially decided by the 
state. And despite sometimes strong pressures from external parties, the regime elites have 
consistently taken a very political approach to these issues, and were unwilling on issues 
which they considered essential. From their point of view, reform was certainly about up-
grading productivity and competitiveness in the business sector, but not at the expense of 
social peace and political stability in the country as a whole. 
A major step forward was made in the mid-1990s when two new ‘national funds’ were 
launched by the state authorities: the National Solidarity Fund (FNS), created in 1994; and 
the National Employment Fund (FNE), created shortly afterwards. Originally, the aim of 
the FNS was to finance basic physical and social infrastructure in particularly disadvan-
taged and underdeveloped areas. However, it underwent a major change two years later. 
Its mission was now substantially widened, and its scope extended, to every corner of the 
country, and every aspect of social life.48 The goal of the FNE, in turn, was to support 
training and employment schemes for young and jobless Tunisians. It was soon comple-
mented by other support mechanisms for adversely affected groups, the most important 
one being the Tunisian Solidarity Bank (BTS), created in 1997. It offers special credits to 
university graduates and other applicants, the amount of which may vary between TD 
5000 and TD 100,000. In this sense, the BTS bridges the gap between micro-credits 
(which are normally extended through so-called development associations via a special 
credit line created in 1999) and normal start-up credits (which may be obtained through 
the Bank for the Financing of SMEs, or BFPME, created in 2004). It is clear that the Tuni-
sian government attributes great importance to social policy issues, and the results of these 
policies shall be scrutinized more closely in the context of chapter seven.49 
6  A case in point: The programme de Mise à Niveau (PMN) 
The national upgrading programme ‘Programme de mise à niveau’ (PMN), which was 
first adopted in 1995, and then successively revised over time, has become the key tool for 
helping Tunisian companies face international competition and survive in an open market 
economy.50 It specifically targets the most sensitive sectors of the national economy, those 
                                                 
48 Officially, the FNS is funded through ‘voluntary contributions’ from private donors. However, these are 
practically mandatory for businessmen, since a refusal to pay has almost invariably been followed by a 
visit from the tax inspector. In this sense, the FNS actually resembles a new social levy (or informal 
capital tax), and exemplifies the shadow fiscality as it has developed during the past two decades. 
49 At first glance, the achieved results appear quite promising: Since their inception, the national funds 
have mobilised TD 900 millions and covered 1829 underdeveloped areas with 1.3 million inhabitants. 
580.000 ‘operations’ (both micro-projects, and micro-credits) with a total investment volume of over 
TD 1 billion have been approved by the BTS so far (cf. the Special Dossier “Les Années Ben Ali, 1987–
2009”, JA 2541, 20/09/09, 51–75 for more details). The main downside of these schemes is that they 
still do not allow for a direct involvement of the grant-giving authority in the management of the start-
up during the critical first years. 
50 Interviews with the Director Generals of the BMN on 21 Oct. 2002 and 24 June 2009. Cf. also the re-
sults of the (unpublished) interim evaluation PMN 2004 and the (publicly available) minutes of the 10th 
anniversary conference “Bilan d’une décennie de mise à niveau industrielle”, hosted by the MIEPME on 
16 May 2006. 
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most concerned by the establishment of free trade with Europe.51 Initially limited to pri-
vate companies in the manufacturing sector, it has come to encompass the near entirety of 
Tunisia’s business actors. It is mainly financed via the Fund for the Development of In-
dustrial Competitiveness (FODEC), which was created in 1994 as the PMN’s financial 
base and which is itself funded via a one percent tax levied on the sales of local goods and 
the value of finished imports.52 The very existence of the PMN thus indicates the implicit 
acknowledgement by Tunisian authorities that their manufacturing firms were (and still 
are) in need of a major collective effort to make them ready for international competition. 
The PMN intervenes at two levels: at the level of the environment of an enterprise, and at 
the level of the enterprise itself. Initially, it consisted of two separate tracks: a pilot 
scheme, scheduled for five years, and limited to a sample of 100 firms; and the main pro-
gramme, scheduled for ten years, and also accessible to the rest of Tunisian industry. Suc-
cessful applicants would get a certain share of their costs reimbursed, covering up to 20 
percent of tangible investments, and up to 70 percent of immaterial investments (the grant 
element being directly related to the financial engagement of the company owner). In 
2000, the scope of the programme was broadened, while procedures were streamlined. 
Participation was now also available for sectors whose modernisation was considered to 
be critical for the success of the programme, like business services, public administration, 
education, and banking. At the same time, a new facility called Priority Technology In-
vestments (ITP) was created, offering tailor-made support for certain priority measures. 
Partly as a result of these amendments, the pace of the programme quickly picked up. 
Several characteristic features make the PMN a generally recognized ‘success story’: On the 
one hand, programming was kept deliberately lean. The PMN’s concept and objectives are 
not based on a specific legislative text; only its operational mechanisms and its financial 
resources have been laid down in a special regulation. It was decided early on that any firm 
operating in manufacturing and related services sectors could participate, as long as it had 
been active for less than two years, was not in public hands, and not in financial difficulties. 
Applicants were not required to comply with particularly elaborate criteria or pass through a 
formalised tendering process, but had to define the problems facing them and propose ideas 
of how to tackle them. This would serve as the basis for an action plan to be drawn up with 
the help of a consulting firm, the bank involved, and/or the Technical Centres.53 
At the same time, decision making would be highly centralised. It was thus decided that 
responsibility for the PMN would lie entirely with the ministry of industry. The obligatory 
entry point for any applicant was the newly created Bureau de mise à niveau (BMN), lo-
cated within the ministry of industry, and led by a senior representative of the ministry. 
The BMN actually constitutes the ‘heart and soul’ of the PMN, responsible for mediating 
                                                 
51 The PMN’s main reference point was the Portuguese industrial development programme PEDIP, 
launched in 1988 to prepare Portuguese manufacturing industries to face the European Single Market. 
52 EU support has been made available from 1996–2002 via the ETE (Europe-Tunisie Entreprise) and 
from 2003–2008 via the PMI (Programme de modernisation industrielle). The ETE’s contribution 
amounted to € 20 million, and the PMI’s to € 50 million. Add to this the support offered by some IFIs 
and national donors. Interviews with representatives of the ETE and the PMI on 19 Apr. 2001 and 25 
June 2009, respectively. 
53 Importantly, the funding made available in the framework of the PMN was used to build up a national 
pool of business consultants who were supposed to play an important role for the country’s economic 
future. 
Industrial policy in Tunisia 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 33
between the administration and the participants. Once it has examined and approved an 
application, the entire dossier would be submitted to a special steering board, the Comité 
de pilotage (COPIL), chaired by the minister of industry, and gathering the main stake-
holders in the country: this includes not only various line ministries (currently the minis-
tries of finance, development & international cooperation, industry, energy & SMEs, 
commerce & handicrafts, as well as education & training), but also the concerned ‘social 
partners’ (banks, employers, and labour unions). The COPIL would then decide on 
whether to approve an application or not, the last word in this regard belonging to the min-
ister of industry. 
The Tunisian authorities have made it clear from the very beginning that the entire pro-
gramming and selection process would be a political and collective exercise. From their 
point of view, procedures and instruments would have to remain lean and flexible, which 
should not only allow them to account for the very different needs of participating firms, 
but also to safeguard the coherence of the programme. The entire process would not only 
involve government representatives, but also concerned non-state actors, even if the last 
word was left to the former. Finally, it was made clear that the modalities of the pro-
gramme would be devised by Tunisians and by nobody but them; contributions from for-
eigners were welcome, but not allowed to dictate the terms. “These decisions amounted to 
a strong degree of centralisation in terms of the formulation and management of the pro-
gramme, and an accompanying restrictiveness with regard to the public debate or the op-
portunities allowed for interest groups to oppose or derail the process” (PMN 2004, 32). 
Over time, the implementation of the programme has considerably picked up speed. The 
manufacturing sector clearly remains its main area of intervention. According to figures 
provided by the MIEPME, altogether 4310 applications from manufacturing companies 
were received by the end of May 2009; 2925 of them were approved, and 1376 remain 
‘under consideration’. Overall investment amounted to TD 4837 million, which included a 
grant element of TD 676 million. With regard to services, 277 applications were received; 
114 of them were approved, and 163 remain ‘under consideration’. Overall investment 
amounted to TD 57 million, which included a grant element of TD 14.5 million.54 Sectoral 
and regional participation more or less reflects the basic structure of the national economy, 
with one important exception. Large firms are clearly over-represented among beneficiar-
ies. According to the official data, the participants’ turnover rose by 10 percent and their 
employment figures by 20 percent as a result of the programme. 
The 11th Plan (2007–2011) foresees the adhesion of 1500 companies with regard to the 
PMN as well as of 2500 companies with regard to ITPs, with a total investment of TD 800 
million and a grant element of TD 280 million. Moreover, several new tools have been 
created since the new programme phase was launched in 2006: a ‘coaching’ and a ‘qual-
ity’ component targeting the participation of 400 and 300 companies, respectively; a 
‘stock exchange’ component aimed at helping companies going public; and a final com-
ponent aimed at facilitating the development of pôles de compétitivité and the restructur-
ing of companies (by forming business networks and export consortia); a fifth component 
to support the financial restructuring of firms and the advancement of their personnel; a 
                                                 
54 The figures for the ITP at the end of March 2006 read as follows: Of 1705 applications received, 1578 
were approved, involving TD 80 million of total investments, and a grant element of TD 36 million. 
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sixth component to accompany the introduction of quality management systems by the 
establishment of the related control mechanisms; and a seventh component to help compa-
nies save energy (inter alia by carrying out energy audits via the state’s agency). 
The Tunisian efforts to upgrade their industries have been supported from the very begin-
ning from various directions, most strongly by the European Community, but also includ-
ing bilateral development cooperation. Some EU member states have been particularly 
active in this regard, notably France (via the AFD), Germany (via GTZ and KfW), Spain 
(via AECID), and Italy (through UNIDO). Within the framework of its Programme d’ap-
pui à l’entrepreneuriat et à l’innovation (PAEI), GTZ has been assisting the BMN (and the 
MIEPME more generally) in upgrading and fine-tuning their working procedures (which 
also includes technical assistance to support structures at the sub-national level). Special 
attention has been paid to issues such as improving the firms’ quality management, up-
grading their workforce, improving their resource management, and increasingly to the 
question of how to promote innovation in general. KfW has contributed € 80 million to 
help improve management at the level of firms and banks, and thereby facilitate their sup-
ply with funding and know-how. AFD has mobilised € 94 million to facilitate the financial 
restructuring of the private sector and improve management structures at the bank level. 
In retrospect, PMN (2004) identifies five key choices which have shaped the unfolding of 
mise à niveau in Tunisia. The first one was to secure Tunisian ownership of the PMN, and 
to reject external interference with key decisions. The second one was to put the PMN at 
the heart of the national development strategy, with unequivocal support from the core 
elite. The third one was to include important stakeholders into decision making, such as 
the ministries, banks, employers, and unions concerned. The fourth one was to address the 
social dimension of industrial modernisation, by timely providing back-up schemes to 
buttress the impact of restructuring, and (partly) compensate the victims of the process. 
And the fifth one was to extend the PMN to adjacent sectors that were relevant for the 
modernisation of industry, and also affected by the association with Europe. 
However, it must be noted that in spite of these successes, a number of issues remain to be 
tackled: To begin with, the weak capitalisation of many firms has posed serious problems 
for programme implementers, reinforced by the structural deficits of the banking sector. 
Further, despite the incentives offered in the framework of the programme, most invest-
ments are still focused on tangible goods, whereas the real deficits of many companies are 
still to be found in the area of immaterial goods (such as the quality of management and 
employees, the improvement of branding and marketing, etc.). Also, the mise à niveau still 
leaves out many traditional sectors with considerable employment potential, e.g. small 
traders and craftsmen. Also, all declarations of intent notwithstanding, actual participation 
(and thus state support) is still heavily slanted in favour of large companies, which often 
already are fairly competitive (at least more so than the many thousands of small firms 
which remain grossly under-represented among the beneficiaries of the programme).55 
                                                 
55 One of the most important obstacles encountered by the PMN is precisely the specific structure of Tuni-
sian SMEs described in more detail above: particularly the lack of distinction between ‘firm’ and 
‘owner’, the patriarchal habitus displayed by many patrons, as well as the traditionally rather half-
hearted and lack-luster, compliance with legal and fiscal obligations. All of this might explain the reluc-
tance of businessmen to exhibit the degree of transparency required for participation in the programme. 
The inevitable consequence of these structural features was that “the momentum of mise à niveau has 
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Aware of the challenges awaiting their country in the context of economic liberalisation, 
the state authorities decided to create another legal ‘safety net’ as a ‘downstream’ comple-
ment to the national upgrading programme: namely the Law 95-34 for ‘enterprises in dif-
ficulty’ (LED). The LED was adopted by parliament in 1996 in order to provide the state 
with a tool that would allow it to save firms from bankruptcy. According the legal text 
published in the Tunisian official journal, the aim of the LED is to “help firms which, ow-
ing to economic difficulties, can no longer (1) secure their activities, (2) maintain their 
jobs, and (3) repay their debts”.56 The guiding principle of the new law is that the survival 
of the firm (and eo ipso the preservation of jobs) definitely takes priority over the recovery 
of debts (and eo ipso the interests of the creditors).  
For the purpose of this study, it is important to understand that both the PMN and the LED 
greatly enhanced the power of the state which will from now on be able to intervene, di-
rectly or indirectly, in the affairs of companies. Thanks to both tools, the state is now in a 
position to gather valuable insights into private companies, and its decisions to allocate or 
withhold resources will be crucial for the success or the survival of many companies. Very 
much like the PMN, the LED is extremely vague in its operational definitions, e.g. about 
what ‘economic difficulties’ means, or how long the recovery programme should last. In 
either case, the outcome of the process is ultimately at the discretion of the state. “The 
judge remains the sole decision maker affecting the survival of the firm, and his decision 
may be at the expense of either the entrepreneur or his creditors”.57 
7  Outcome and impact of Tunisia's industrial policy 
Tunisia’s domestic market has undergone a significant opening since the mid-1980s. Fac-
tor prices are now largely governed by market forces (except for some sensitive products). 
A clear majority of SOEs have been divested over time. Market openness has constantly 
improved for private investors (again with some qualifications for sensitive sectors). 
Shares in operating companies can now be purchased without prior authorisation for up to 
50 percent of a company’s equity. Foreigners investing in agriculture can hold up to 66 
percent of a local company. Foreign investors can repatriate profits and proceeds from 
capital sales. The Tunisian Dinar has been made convertible for current transactions since 
1994. Any foreign company with its head office in Tunisia can transfer all capital income, 
both for commercial and production-related transactions. Private firms are allowed to 
build and run public facilities on the basis of PPP contracts.58 
                                                                                                                                                   
diminished as the programme has been rolled out to the weakest and most conservative elements of the 
industrial sector” (PMN 2004, 30). 
56  JORT 33, 25 Apr. 1995, 792–795 
57 See: Cassarino 1999, 69: The first serious test for the LED was the crash of BATAM in 2002. By offer-
ing credit-financed consumer goods to middle-class Tunisians, BATAM had within a few years become 
one of the largest firms in the country. The ‘Affaire BATAM’ quickly took on a national dimension, not 
only for financial reasons (nearly all of Tunisia’s banks and thousands of its citizens were involved), but 
also for political reasons, BATAM having turned into a publicly vaunted ‘success story’ of the ‘New 
Tunisia’ (cf. Rida Lahmar: “Qui arrêtera la chute de BATAM?” Réalités 877, 17 Oct. 2002, 12–14; 
“BATAM: les vrais chiffres”, Réalités 883, 28 Nov. 2002, 24–27). 
58 The fact that agriculture and agri-business have been excluded so far from tariff dismantling explains 
why the Tunisian economy as a whole continues to feature a comparatively high level of external pro-
tection. 
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Today, Tunisia’s economic relations with its main partner countries are governed by free-
trade agreements. The EMAA is fully applicable since 2008, with the result that industrial 
exchange among both sides is no longer subject to quantitative restrictions or customs 
duties or measures having an equivalent effect. (Behind-the-border trade barriers, like 
technical standards or sanitary rules, are a different matter and are being addressed at the 
level of bilateral committees and in the framework of the WTO; the same applies to agri-
culture and services). Tunisia is also a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA) which currently encompasses 18 member states. The GAFTA agreement which 
became fully applicable in 2005 has been complemented by bilateral FTAs with other 
countries, such as Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Libya, and Turkey. Tunisia also benefits from 
reduced tariffs under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for agricultural, manu-
factured, and handmade exports to Japan, Canada, the USA, and others.59 
When designing and implementing the above policies and programmes, the ruling elites 
were careful to not only stay in control of the process of change, but also to cushion its 
impact on society. Generally, they have chosen to follow a rather careful, incremental ap-
proach to economic and social reforms: meaning they were eager to accompany them with 
all kinds of safeguard mechanisms in order to mitigate disruptive effects on the social fab-
ric. Despite sometimes strong misgivings and open criticism from both its own economic 
liberalisers, and foreign donors, the regime has been eager to avoid any move that could 
have led to a popular backlash. Ben Ali himself made this very clear in a speech he gave 
in 1995, where he stated that the most successful countries, in terms of developing without 
social disruptions, had been those that, “in formulating and implementing their plans, had 
ensured complementarity between economic and social reforms”.60 
Generally speaking, the ruling elites have combined two approaches. On the one hand, 
they have maintained the existing social security schemes, which were primarily focused 
on key social groups (like state officials and public sector employees). Benefits include 
subsidised commodities and utilities (e.g. staples, fuel, health care, local transport, educa-
tion, and housing). A noteworthy decision is also the maintenance of minimum wages. At 
the same time, they have created new support schemes which now specifically target po-
litically important elements (such as the ‘new’ middle classes and the urban poor). These 
include preferential customs rates for small cars, subsidised personal computers for low-
income families, and subsidised internet rates via the publinets. Another important novelty 
is a much stronger focus on the interior provinces. It must be noted, however, that these 
schemes are partly run outside the state budget, and often granted in an ad-hoc fashion. 
This applies in particular to the national funds which are directly controlled by the presi-
dential palace and usually targeted at a very specific population: namely those groups who 
provided the popular base for the anti-Bourguibist opposition. 
                                                 
59 Tunisia has also adhered to the COMESSA, which aims to foster economic exchanges across the Sa-
hara. In addition, it benefits from preferential access to some African countries, like Senegal, Burkina 
Faso, and Niger. 
60  Ben Ali quoted in AAN 1995, 800 (emphasis added). 
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All things considered, this economic policy has produced quite remarkable results so far.61 
Since the early 1990s, the Tunisian economy has achieved sustained growth rates of over 
five per cent per year, well above the MENA average (with strong annual variations, how-
ever, due to shifting agricultural outputs). GDP has risen to TD 54.1 billion in 2008, and 
GDP per capita to TD 4810 (US$ 7875 in PPP terms). Despite the current global down-
turn, GDP growth has continued in 2009, albeit at a slower pace, at about 3 percent. On 
average, during the 2000s, private consumption accounted for 63–64 percent of GDP, state 
consumption for 14–16 percent, and gross fixed investment for 22–24 percent. Moreover, 
economic growth has been largely trade-driven (with trade growth generally doubling 
GDP growth since 1985). Annual foreign trade flows amounted to TD 53.8 billion in 
2008, with exports at TD 23.6 billion (+21.9 percent), and imports at TD 30.2 billion 
(+23.7 percent) (tourism accounted for another TD 7 billion). This has raised Tunisia’s 
market openness ratio from about 40 percent in the early 1980s to over 100 percent today. 
Importantly, gains in economic growth have not been bought at the expense of macro-
economic stability. Most indicators at this level show a very healthy performance to date. 
In 2008, inflation averaged 3 percent, the budgetary deficit stood at 3 percent, the public 
debt had fallen to 39.2 percent (down from 58 percent in 1986). In 2008, the foreign debt 
service consumed 7.9 percent of current receipts, a very moderate figure in historical per-
spective. Foreign cash reserves currently stand at a comfortable US$ 8.9 billion. Broadly 
speaking, inflows and outflows are more or less balanced. Persisting structural deficits in 
Tunisia’s foreign trade (themselves a result of the necessity to import a wide range of 
goods, from primary products and raw materials via machines and spare parts to consumer 
and investment products) are generally counter-financed by surpluses in other fields 
(mainly tourist receipts, migrant remittances, ODA transfers, and gas pipeline royalties). 
In 2007, the current-account and balance-of-payment deficits were a manageable TD 
2.876 billion and 905 million respectively. Crucially, this quite bright overall picture has 
so far been affected surprisingly little by the current global economic crisis.62 
Moreover, these high economic growth rates have translated into substantial welfare gains 
for broad social strata – something that cannot be said for many other parts of the develop-
ing world. Today, most Tunisians (80 percent of whom are officially rated middle class) 
enjoy considerably higher living standards than some time ago. Poverty rates have sub-
stantially decreased, with less than 5 percent of people now living below the poverty line 
(<$2 per day), and zero percent living in absolute poverty (<$1 per day). Most Tunisians 
now have access to basic public services: 80 percent are connected to the sewage system, 
and over 90 percent to the electricity grid. National health figures have constantly im-
proved: Life expectancy now stands at almost 75 years, and child mortality at 21/1000. 
Education-related figures are among the best in the region: Primary enrolment rates have 
risen to 99 percent, and the overall literacy rate to about 75 percent. All these advances are 
                                                 
61 The following data were mainly derived from www.investintunisia.tn. Cf. also the country reports of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit as well as the Special Dossier “Les Années Ben Ali, 1987–2009”, JA 2541, 
20/09/09, 51–75 for further details and cross-comparisons. Annex 1 provides a short overview. 
62 Tunisia enjoys good credit ratings with international rating agencies: It has been awarded a ‘Baa2’ by 
Moody’s, a ‘BBB’ by both Standard & Poor’s and IBCA, and an ‘investor grade status’ by the EUI. Tu-
nisians are thus increasingly able to refinance themselves on commercial conditions on the international 
markets. 
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reflected by Tunisia’s constantly improving Human Development Index (HDI), which has 
been rising from 0.516 in 1975 via 0.623 in 1985 and 0.696 in 1995 to 0.769 in 2009. 
After two decades of rapid growth, the fabric of the country’s economy has changed sig-
nificantly. Industry (and specifically manufacturing) has gained a lot in importance (its 
share of GDP rising to about 30 percent, up from 20–25 percent in the late Bourguibist 
era), while agriculture has lost (its share falling to about 10 percent, down from 20–25 
percent two decades ago). The services sector still stands at about 60 percent, half of 
which is owned by the state. All of this means that Tunisia has gone at least some way 
toward becoming an industrial society. At the end of 2007, there were 5700 industrial 
companies registered with API, 2670 of them totally exporting altogether employing 
478,000 people. Total production has risen to TD 30.7 billion, and total investment stood 
at TD 1.184 billion (an annual increase of 9 percent and 5 percent respectively since the 
early 2000s).63 80 percent of total exports are now industrial products, and 90 percent of 
industrial exports are manufactured products (up from 40 percent in the early 1980s). This 
has been accompanied by major structural shifts within the manufacturing sector, which 
can be seen from a closer look at its two main components: namely the textile & garment 
industries (ITH), and the mechanical, electrical & electronic industries (IMEE).64 
The textile & garment industries, and to a lesser extent also the leather & footwear indus-
tries, are still key pillars of the national economy, which, however, suffer from a tradition-
ally low degree of vertical integration into the local economy, and an equally strong focus 
on simple assembly activities with low added value. Even though the companies in these 
sectors have indeed been negatively affected by the ending of the MFA in 2005 and the 
growing competition from Chinese producers, they have so far been able to economically 
survive and even partially recover (at least before the onset of the current crisis).65 A 
three-year government programme launched in 2005 has so far provided assistance to 800 
firms. Especially the large firms have been able to move into higher-value markets, with a 
greater emphasis on innovation, quality, and speed of delivery. A key variable has been 
their readiness and ability to capitalise on their familiarity with, and proximity to, Euro-
pean markets. Partly as a result of this, several large transnational producers, like Benetton 
and Adidas, have relocated production to Tunisia. There is thus a good chance that these 
two sectors will manage to hold their ground in the future, even though it is very unlikely 
that they will be able to expand in size beyond the current level.66 
                                                 
63 Of the 1874 foreign companies registered with API at the end of 2007 (most of them from France and 
Italy), 1106 were 100 percent foreign owned, and 1570 were totally exporting. Cf. also Annex 2 for fur-
ther information about the current situation of Tunisia’s manufacturing sector. 
64 The ITH sector is made up of 2400 companies; these export 25 percent of their output, but represent 
only 4 percent of GDP. The IMEE sector, by contrast, is made up of only 300 companies; these export 
almost the same proportion, namely 26 percent, of their output, but this represent 5 percent of GDP. Cf. 
Pascal Airault & Marie Barraud: “Comment passer à travers les mailles chinoises” JA 2296, 09/01/05, 
106–108 and Samir Gharbi “La Tunisie met le turbo”, JA 2543, 04/10/09, 61–63 for further details on 
these two sectors. 
65 It must be noted, though, that the ITH sector has indeed been negatively affected by the current crisis, 
with exports declining by 15 percent and investments by 20 percent during the first six months of 2009. 
66 IHK Tunis therefore considers that these two sectors are particularly useful examples of how a pro-
active state policy can help a ‘strategic’ industry to face up to international competition (Interview 16 
June 2009). 
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The mechanical, electrical, and electronic industries have become another central pillar of 
the national economy, with an annual growth rate of over 7 percent since the early 2000s 
(mainly steel processing, white goods, car and aircraft cables and components). In 2008, 
they surpassed textiles as the most important manufacturing sector. In 2007, it contributed 
22 percent to total manufacturing output and 4.1 percent to GDP. Most companies in this 
sector are outward-oriented: They export 80 percent of what they produce, and 80 percent 
of these exports go to Europe. The sector has attracted hundreds of EU and US manufac-
turers of vehicle and aircraft-components. The most recent ‘acquisition’ has been Airbus 
Industries, which is about to set up a major new plant in the Greater Tunis area. The over-
all number of jobs is expected to increase from currently 30,000 to over 50,000 in 2011. 
Even though the sector has been affected by the current global slowdown and particularly by 
its effects on the European car industry, it has suffered less badly than expected, and cer-
tainly less badly than others (due to the ‘cash-for-clunkers’ programmes adopted by several 
European governments, and its relative cost efficiency vis-à-vis foreign competitors).67 
Foreign direct investment inflows have continuously increased over the past two decades, 
passing from TD 402.9 million in 1997 to TD 3,127.3 million in 2008 (while portfolio 
investment was a mere TD 198.5 million). In that year, they accounted for 6.5 percent of 
GDP, 20 percent of gross fixed capital formation, and 20 percent of all newly created 
jobs.68 There are currently nearly 3000 registered foreign companies, employing altogether 
over 300,000 people. Traditionally focused on a handful of branches (mainly energy, tex-
tile, and tourism), FDI have seen a considerable diversification in recent years. Regarding 
their sectoral distribution in 2008 (energy excluded), data analysis reveals that services 
accounted for the largest share with TD 646.7 million (43.2 percent), followed by manu-
facturing with an investment volume of TD 641.6 million (42.8 percent) and tourism with 
an investment volume of TD 192 million (12.8 percent). The strong annual variations in 
foreign investment inflows are largely due to the uneven progress of the privatization 
process, as foreign participation in public markets (with the energy sector in the first 
place) still represents a major share of foreign involvement. At the same time, inward in-
vestments from the Arab Gulf states have come to play an increasingly important role.69 
The relative robustness of Tunisia’s economic advances can also be seen from the fact that 
the country (very much like the majority of its neighbours) has so far not been overly af-
fected by the current crisis. Brach and Loewe (2009) have distinguished between four 
kinds of adverse effects: asset effects (depreciation of assets held abroad), financial effects 
(reduction of inward investment), economic effects (reduction of export earnings), and 
transfer effects (reduction of migrant remittances and development aid). As far as Tunisia 
is concerned, the first two effects have so far had hardly any impact at all. The state itself 
                                                 
67 Thus, while exports have declined by 10 percent during the first six months of 2009, investments have 
grown by 15 percent, which points to the relative optimism prevailing among most producers. 
68 In UNCTAD’s FDI Performance Index which measures the relative importance of a country’s FDI 
against its economic size and its share in global GDP, Tunisia is ranked 42nd in the world. 
69 In 2007, investment inflows from the Gulf States even briefly surpassed those of the West. In the case 
of the Maghreb, Gulf investments have so far been mainly targeted at the real estate, construction, and 
tourism sectors (cf Jean-Michel Meyer “Golfe: OPA sur le Maghreb”, JA 2472, 25/05/09, 22–27 for fur-
ther details). 
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has not invested abroad, and banks are still little integrated into global circuits.70 The same 
observation applies to the fourth effect: Most Tunisian migrants have become nationalised 
by their host countries (and thus are not subject to reprisals), and most ODA transfers are 
tied to long-term reform programmes. The largest impact has so far been exerted by the 
third effect: Exports to Europe have declined significantly since early 2009, most notably 
in important sectors like the IMEE. The shrinking income from European tourists has been 
mitigated by the growing number of Arab visitors, mainly from neighbouring countries.71 
Importantly, there have been no major reductions in FDI inflows, and the majority of for-
eign companies present on Tunisian soil seem determined to maintain their presence. (To 
some extent, Tunisia could even expect to benefit from the crisis, as its pretty attractive 
cost-benefit ratio seems to have become more salient for its foreign clients.) Finally, losses 
in export earnings have been largely offset by reductions in fuel prices. As a result, growth 
is projected to continue in 2009, albeit at a slower pace, in the order of 3–4 percent.72 
Tunisia’s fairly positive performance in most international economic rankings reflects the 
country’s undeniable progress in many regards (see Annex 5 for more details). Thus, the 
fact that Tunisia has scored very well in the latest issues of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of 
Doing Business’ Report, the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Competitiveness Index’, 
and Transparency International’s ‘Corruption Perception Index’ certainly points to the fact 
that Tunisia’s business climate has considerably improved over the past two decades. 
However, some structural shortcomings still overshadow the Tunisian ‘success story’: 
1. The country continues to be entirely dependent on just a handful of foreign markets. 
European countries still account for about 70 percent of all Tunisian imports, 80 per-
cent of all exports, and 90 percent of all FDI. Three countries alone (France, Italy, and 
Germany) absorb two thirds of Tunisia’s foreign trade, and represent over three quar-
ters of all non-resident manufacturing companies. South-South trade, on the contrary, 
has still not seen a real take-off, and continues to stagnate at about eight percent of 
Tunisia’s foreign trade. These very modest figures reflect the almost total lack of ma-
jor alternative outlets in the near abroad. There are simply no economic hubs in the 
wider neighbourhood that could serve as a viable substitute to European markets (as 
the Gulf Countries have done for the Arab Mashreq, for instance). Algeria and, to a 
lesser extent, Libya are the only Arab countries that truly matter, economically speak-
ing, to Tunisia. 
2. The Tunisian economy is still extraordinarily dependent on just a handful of sectors. 
The ongoing predominance of the textile and garment sector, reinforced by the leather 
                                                 
70 On the contrary, the Tunisian stock exchange has gained another 48 percent in 2009 compared to 2008 
(the strongest increase in any North African country), and the real estate market has also continued its 
upward trend (even though some major investment projects by Arab Gulf investors have been put on 
hold). 
71 Arab visitors have largely replaced European tourists as one of Tunisia’s main sources of national in-
come (with Libyans in the order of 2.5 million per year, and Algerians in the order of 1 million) (cf. also 
FN 74). 
72 Cf. Jean-Michel Meyer “Le Maghreb résiste au choc de la crise”, JA 2515, 22/03/09, 79–81 plus the two 
Special Dossiers “Pourquoi les investissements ne connaissent pas la crise”, JA 2527, 14/06/09, 65–84 
and “Comment résister à la crise”, JA 2495, 02/11/08, 63–80. Cf. also the interview with minister of fi-
nance M. Rachid Kechiche in JA 2541, 20/09/09, 62–64 for a short overview of Tunisian safeguard 
measures. 
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and shoe sector, is a particular reason for concern. In mid-2009, the country’s regis-
tered 2100 textile firms (plus another 300 leather firms) accounted for 42 percent of all 
industrial exports (over TD 6 billion) and 50 percent of total industrial employment 
(almost 250,000 jobs). This makes Tunisia one of the largest textile producers, and the 
main textile producer per capita, worldwide. Thus, the textile sector is still Tunisia’s 
‘point fort’, but also its ‘maillon faible’. The strong growth of the mechanical, electri-
cal, and electronic sector in recent years has somewhat reduced this one-sided depend-
ency, and simultaneously strengthened Tunisia’s industrial foundation, but it must be 
noted that the latter itself is also quite vulnerable to negative developments in the 
world market, as evidenced in by the various adverse effects of the current economic 
slowdown.73 
3. Most of Tunisia’s buoyant manufacturing industry is still limited to rather simple as-
sembly activities (although there is a trend from sub-contracting to end products in 
many segments). Tunisia is still hardly in a position to produce sophisticated equip-
ment or investment goods, and continues to focus on low-cost intermediary or con-
sumer products (albeit with more promising perspectives for the ICT sector). Foreign 
financial inflows are still largely attracted by cheap local inputs and/or some specific 
natural advantages, and not so much by dynamic market developments and/or specific 
technological advances on the ground. Thus, Tunisia has still not been able to make 
the long-planned qualitative breakthrough toward a fully developed industrial econ-
omy. Most private industrialists are still reluctant to venture into capital, knowledge, 
and technology-intensive sectors, and prefer to focus on relatively simple, well-known, 
and low-risk activities, which require little financial, technical, and logistical input, but 
generate quick, easy, and secure profits. These preferences are not only attributable to 
the many still problematic incentives on a legal-institutional level, but also to the in-
ternal logic of these family holdings. 
4. Tunisia’s economy is highly fragmented. In fact, one can still find almost the same 
basic economic fault-lines as during the former era. These concern in particular the 
cleavages between public and private, between on-shore and off-shore, between im-
port-substituting and export-oriented businesses, and between the few large and the 
many small firms. Even though the state has progressively withdrawn from the field of 
production and reduced its previously high level of economic interference, it continues 
to be the prime actor in economic life. It is still the main proprietor, producer, em-
ployer, investor, and creditor in the country, employing up to 40 percent of the na-
tional workforce, and accounting for well over 50 percent of GDP. In addition, it con-
tinues to directly or indirectly control all those sectors and bodies that affect the thrust 
of development and/or the exercise of power. Certainly, the private sector has become 
much more developed than before. A variety of new branches have emerged, particu-
larly in the manufacturing industry and business services. The number of private firms 
                                                 
73 Some qualifications are also in order for the tourism sector, another pillar of the Tunisian economy. 
Following a drastic slump in the early 2000s, it has largely recovered, the losses on traditional markets 
mostly compensated by inroads into new market segments, such as inter-Arab tourism. Still, it suffers 
from excess capacities at home, and a low spending per capita. At the time of writing, Tunisia’s tourism 
industry generates about 400,000 jobs, attracts almost 20 percent of its foreign revenues, and represents 
almost 7 percent of its GDP. It is therefore still fulfilling a vitally important stabilising function as an 
economic safety valve (cf. Frida Dahmani: “Tunisie: Ciel bleu, sable blanc … mais encore?” JA 2593, 
19/09/10, 44–45 for further details). 
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is estimated at 60–70,000, 10–12,000 of which are considered industrial companies. 
However, it must be noted that compared to public enterprises, even the largest private 
ventures are still fairly small, and that within the private sector, these ‘heavy weights’ 
are still relatively scarce.74 
5. The current state of the financial sector is another reason for concern.75 Sure, the num-
ber of institutes has been consolidated, their working procedures have been modern-
ised, and their balance sheets cleaned up. But the entire sector continues to suffer from 
a certain number of structural deficiencies: First, Tunisian banks are still very small 
and under-capitalised, even by MENA standards.76 Second, Tunisian banks are still 
relatively indebted – even though soft loans have reportedly fallen below the 20 per-
cent mark.77 Finally, Tunisian banks are still quite ‘politicised’ (their senior manage-
ment still being very much inter-twined with the political leadership, which makes 
them structurally vulnerable to demands emanating from there). In short, Tunisia’s 
banking system is still characterised by a very high, albeit slowly declining level of 
vertical fragmentation and asset concentration. Commercial banks still hold about two 
thirds of national financial assets, and the state still owns almost half of the capital of 
these banks. 
Therefore, a closer look reveals that some fundamental disequilibria of the Tunisian econ-
omy persist, which need to be addressed urgently. First, the Tunisian economy is still es-
sentially a ‘dualist economy’; its most dynamic and competitive elements are usually 
owned by foreign investors (or by the few large domestic groups), are largely turned to-
ward external markets, and are little integrated into their local context. Second, social ine-
qualities and regional disparities have not disappeared, but might have actually increased; 
economic growth has mostly been confined to the coastal cities, with the interior provinces 
further falling behind.78 Third, and most importantly, the traditionally high unemploy-
ment, particularly among young city dwellers, has not been reduced, but is growing rap-
idly; many Tunisians are still out of work (15 percent officially, 25 percent unofficially). 
Globally speaking, un(der)employment remains the challenge No. 1 for Tunisians. The 
labour force numbered 3.6 million in 2007, 52 percent of the working-age population. The 
share of women has risen to about one quarter of the total. Around 16 percent of the work-
force are employed in agriculture (including seasonal workers), around 32 percent in in-
dustry, and about 52 percent in services (including the public sector). Large numbers are 
also employed on a temporary or seasonal basis, especially in agriculture and construction. 
The turnover of the informal sector is estimated to be equivalent to 15 percent of GDP. 
Officially, the number of jobless was around 510,000 in 2007, about half of whom were 
                                                 
74 Senior representatives of the MIEPME, for instance, consider 95 percent of all Tunisian companies to 
be ‘SMEs’ (with a coût global d’investissement equal or inferior to TD 5 million). 
75  Cf. the Special Dossier “Tunisie: le secteur financier face à la crise”, JA 2514, 15/03/09, 85–96 for fur-
ther details in this regard. 
76 In 2008, the two largest banks, STB and BIAT, were ranked only 94th and 96th among the 100 largest 
Arab banks, their equity standing at only US$ 351 million and US$ 330 million; cf. Middle East Maga-
zine, October 2009. 
77 Credits to individuals have more than doubled, rising from TD 3.1 billion in 2003 to TD 7.3 billion in 
2008; they now constitute 28 percent of total bank credits, with 68 percent tied up in real estate. 
78 The recent increases in inward investment might reverse this trend over time, but it still appears too 
early to make further statements in this regard. 
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under 25. A major concern for the government has been the rising unemployment among 
university graduates (over 20 percent to date).79 Unemployment most seriously affects the 
north-west and south-west where it exceeds 20 percent and 25 percent, respectively. 
All of this might explain the strong political undertow of Tunisian industrial policy.80 It is 
in the first degree about short-term job creation, and only in the second degree about 
longer-term industrial deepening, and resource allocation by the government clearly re-
flects these priorities. One cannot avoid the strong impression that the ruling elites around 
Ben Ali are actually more concerned with maintaining political stability than with in-
creasing economic efficiency – and are prepared to pay a price for this. Absolute priority is 
given to maintaining social peace and public order, even at the cost of reduced economic 
growth and higher opportunity costs. This can be seen in their very cautious approach to-
ward socio-economic reforms. Their visible reluctance to ‘rush’ into public sector and 
social policy reforms is clearly inspired by the painful experiences of the later Bourguibist 
era and other Arab countries. As Sadiki (2002, 59) has pointed out, “the regime is taking 
no chances with welfarism. Thus it has absorbed the lessons of the past, from within and 
without, that state failure in this domain opens up space for not only pro-active Islamist-
led grassroots social engineering, but also for all kinds of other non-state activism.” No-
body within the regime has so far dared to openly attack this line of thinking. 
One example for this very cautious approach is the stalled liberalisation of money markets, 
especially with regard to the convertibility of the dinar. In fact, the state’s monetary policy 
has played a key role in the country’s economic development.81 As its traditional primary 
purpose is to maintain a current account balance, the government has systematically de-
preciated the dinar since the 1980s, with the double aim of curbing the appetite of domes-
tic consumers for imported goods, and boosting the international competitiveness of local 
manufacturers. Indeed, this is still one of the most important, but also the most sensitive 
issues in Tunisian politics. The state of affairs is that the national currency has been made 
fully convertible for current account transactions of non-Tunisian resident companies, 
which face no restrictions when it comes to exporting or repatriating their profits or their 
invested capital. When travelling abroad, Tunisian citizens can also change small sums of 
foreign currency and, with the prior approval of the Central Bank, Tunisian firms can 
make overseas investments. However, in spite of all the inconveniences which this brings 
in daily life, the regime has so far shied away from crossing the threshold of full converti-
bility. The option of controlling financial flows is considered too attractive, and the les-
sons of the current crisis have rather served to strengthen this way of thinking.82 
                                                 
79 It must be noted that 50-60,000 of the 80-90,000 annual newcomers on the labour market now have 
higher education, and these figures are bound to increase further in the years ahead. Some unofficial es-
timates even put Tunisia’s current graduate unemployment rate at about 50 percent. Cf. Cécile Manci-
aux “Un diplômé = un boulot?” JA 2576, 22/06/08, 70–71for further reading in this regard. 
80 This very strong politicisation of economic policy is actually quite usual for the wider MENA region, as 
both Henry / Springborg (2001) and Nabli et al. (2006) have pointed out. 
81 Traditionally, Tunisian exchange rate policy consists of a controlled floating, with an implicit peg to a 
representative basket of European currencies (since 2003 mainly the Euro). 
82 GTAI Tunis considers that there has been no increase in wages in real terms over the past 15 years. The 
government generally keeps wage increases slightly above the inflation rate, while neutralising the ef-
fects of this policy by a controlled depreciation of the Tunisian Dinar (Interview, 19 June 2009). 
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Another example is the ongoing delay of a major land reform, despite (or because of) the 
central role which this sector plays for the economy. In fact, it must not be forgotten that 
agriculture continues to matter for Tunisia. Farming and fishing still represent over 10 
percent of GDP, and provide over 30 percent of total employment. However, the large 
majority of Tunisian farms continue to be tiny, under-capitalised, and under-equipped 
plots, with very little non-traditional technical and managerial know-how. Deficits concern 
a range of issues: availability of credit, technical support, marketing tools, etc. Although 
most people seem to agree that the farming and food processing sector has an enormous 
and untapped potential, discourse has tended to be followed by inaction. The main reason 
for this is that distribution is still controlled by the state, and many food products are still 
sold at artificially low prices in order to keep the urban population calm. Also, European 
markets are still very difficult to access for Tunisian producers, which severely limits the 
production of cash crops. There are certainly indicators that suggest that the recent price 
rally on world food markets has contributed to changing the minds of quite a number of 
Tunisians, but it is still too early to make definite judgements in this regard.83 
A final example is the stalled liberalisation of large parts of the services sector, which is 
still regulated by special legislation and largely shielded from international competition. In 
fact, with 60 percent of GDP, the services sector is still a corner stone of the national 
economy. This observation applies in particular to many ‘traditional’ sectors, such as tour-
ism, gastronomy, construction, transport, and retail trade (even though new sectors, like 
telecoms, logistics, leisure and entertainment, financial services and customer relations are 
quickly gaining in importance). At the same time, most businesses in these sectors are still 
very small. In fact, ‘les petits metiers’ (i.e. small shop owners, restaurant owners, and 
craftsmen) continue to play a fundamental role in everyday life. The well-known transna-
tional chains are still conspicuously absent from daily life. Services directly related to in-
dustry are the only part of this sector that is de facto open to the outside world. Even 
though this cautiousness is certainly vindicated from various points of view, it comes at 
great expense for the envisaged development of the national economy.84 
8  Resume and suggestions 
All in all, Tunisia’s industrial policy has yielded quite remarkable results. Over the past 
two decades, a previously relatively closed and inward-oriented state-driven economy 
(heavily dominated by the public sector and insulated from foreign competition) has been 
turned into an increasingly outward-oriented and export-fuelled market economy which is 
more and more based on a modern and competitive manufacturing industry, and run by a 
vibrant and dynamic entrepreneurial class. In this way, a largely rent-based, lower middle-
income developing country has been transformed into an increasingly skill-based, indus-
try-driven ‘emerging economy’, which has consistently produced growth rates and welfare 
gains above the regional average and not too far from some of the ‘Asian Tigers’. It does not 
                                                 
83  Cf. also the two Special Dossiers “Tunisie: (r)évolution verte”, JA 2549, 15/11/09, 67–78 and “Tunisie: 
le défi agricole”, JA 2470, 11/05/08, 61–73 for further reading in this regard. 
84  Cf. Galia Skander: “Tunisie: la grande distribution capte uniquement 5% du commerce”, Tunisie Af-
faire, 18/04/08 and Jamel Arfaoui: “Tunisie: l’extension urbaine menace les petits commerces”, Magha-
rebia, 17/07/09 
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seem exaggerated to argue that Tunisia has gone at least some way toward becoming an 
industrial society – with significant repercussions for the accessibility and allocation of na-
tional resources and social opportunities, for the structures and mechanisms regulating the 
production and distribution of values and goods, and last but not least for the configuration 
and interaction among the various social and political actor groups within the country. 
In fact, it appears that Ben Ali’s ‘New Tunisia’ has digested the economic transition proc-
ess launched over three decades ago remarkably well. It has implemented economic liber-
alisation and restructuring without major shake-ups or hold-ups so far. This has substan-
tially strengthened the country’s international competitiveness and broadened its economic 
base, which has in turn reduced the importance of rentier elements and diminished its vul-
nerability vis-à-vis exogenous pressures. Finally, Tunisia can claim generally rising living 
standards as well as diminishing poverty rates, both in line with the regime’s original 
promises and its policy goals.85 Even 15 years into the association process, the country has 
not witnessed any mass layoffs or mass shutdowns, in the same way as the often predicted 
large-scale social disturbances and disruptions have not materialised so far. Importantly, 
the Tunisian economy has relatively smoothly absorbed the numerous external shocks that 
have shaken the region since the beginning of the 21st century. It has done so rather better 
than many of its peers, and much better than analysts had predicted some time ago. There 
are no signs of a massive cutback of private investment or a comprehensive withdrawal of 
foreign operators (although Tunisian subcontractors in the automobile industry have been 
affected), which attests to their confidence in the robustness of the Tunisian economy.86 
It is, of course, difficult to clearly attribute these developments and outcomes observable 
at the socio-economic level to activities and decisions taken at the (industrial) policy level: 
Overall, it is beyond doubt that Tunisian policy makers have a remarkable ability to shape 
societal processes in their country. Thanks to the strong concentration of decision making, 
and the remarkable cohesion of the party-state elites, the government is still clearly in a 
position to determine strategic objectives and allocate public resources accordingly. At the 
same time, it still also has the ability to communicate its choices both to its own political 
followers and the broad public, and to mobilize their allegiance and support for them (or at 
least to prevent the crystallisation of resistance). This also applies to industrial policy: 
Since the beginning of collectivisation in the 1960s, the emergence of a private manufac-
turing sector in the 1970s, and the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Tunisian state has repeatedly shown that it is able to shape both the intensity and the 
quality of economic life and industrial development in the country. The combination of 
                                                 
85 Tunisia is among the few Arab countries that are likely to reach a significant proportion of the ‘Millennium Devel-
opment Goals’ (MDG) adopted by UN member states at the 2000 ‘Millennium Summit’ in New York. 
86 The Tunisian government’s remarkable adroitness in harnessing foreign development assistance has also played an 
important role in this respect. Even though ODA inflows appear modest at first glance (especially when measured 
against Tunisia’s GDP and its population), it must be noted that they have made major contributions to the eco-
nomic success of Tunisian policies. Large parts of the country’s physical and non-physical infrastructure have been 
built up with the help of foreign technical and financial assistance. This is also why the government is so deter-
mined to defend its access to this source of funding. At the same time, it must also be noted that the overall thrust – 
the ‘nuts and bolts’ – of Tunisia’s industrial policy are determined by Tunisian policy makers and by nobody but 
them; external actors (donors, advisers, investors, etc.) are certainly able to exert a degree of influence, but this is 
mostly concerned with the details of this policy (as well as its implementation on the ground), but not with the sub-
stance as such. The Tunisian ownership can thus be regarded as very high, even if this does not always entail an 
equally pro-active approach toward donor coordination. 
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both direct and indirect incentives, coupled with the provision of both financial and tech-
nical support, has developed enough credibility and traction to persuade private investors 
(both within and without) to follow up these policies with their funds. 
However, the ability of the state to influence and direct the corporate strategies and in-
vestment decisions of economic operators clearly has its limits. As noted before, the ma-
jority of Tunisian businessmen (and the same observation also applies grosso modo to the 
majority of foreign investors active on Tunisian soil) are only prepared to invest in rela-
tively simple and low-risk activities which promise quick and secure profits or, to put it 
differently, they are not ready to invest their personal fortune into economic products 
which take a long time (and substantial funding) to develop, require complex organisa-
tions and external investment, and/or involve extensive technological know-how and in-
dustrial research. This is also one of the reasons why neither Tunisian entrepreneurs nor 
their foreign counterparts have so far managed (or bothered) to produce sophisticated 
technological products and/or high-end consumer goods. The main exceptions to this rule 
are once again to be found in the area of business services.87 
In fact, the country is only halfway to becoming an industrial society. A major problem in 
this regard seems to be that the government continues to be torn between two conflicting 
goals: On the hand, it seeks to support the further acceleration of capital accumulation and 
deepening of local value chains, in order to lay the groundwork for the envisioned upward 
shift towards more sophisticated goods with a higher added value. This, however, is a very 
time and capital-intensive endeavour that would require a major, concerted, and sustained 
effort of both public and private actors, and thereby absorb most of the country’s limited 
financial and human resources for years to come. On the other hand, Tunisians are still 
very much concerned with the creation of new jobs and the accumulation of employment 
opportunities in order to absorb the country’s growing labour force and maintain societal 
stability. According to official figures, state subsidies for ‘vital products’ (mainly staples, 
fuels, and medicine) amounted to TD 3.7 billion in 2008 alone, that is, 7 percent of the 
country’s GDP! The problem with this strategy is that it is very difficult for such a small 
country ‘to have it both ways’ or, to put it differently, ‘to eat its cake and have it, too’. 
Partly as a consequence of these conflicts, Tunisia’s industrial policy has never been as 
coherent and systematic as those applied by East Asian countries (cf. Noland / Pack 2005). 
Unlike them, it has never systematically pursued local content policies, pushed for high-
tech development within the manufacturing sector, or tied state support to proven results 
on the world market. Instead of trying to identify some specific sectors and market niches 
with an over-proportionate growth potential and return component (and shift public re-
sources in their direction), it has until recently tended to apply incentives across the board, 
hoping that this would somehow elicit a positive response from business and that the re-
sults of this response would somehow ‘add up’. The only real systematic discrimination 
that is actually applied is between on-shore and off-shore – and more recently between 
investments in ‘normal’ and in ‘priority’ sectors. Of course, there is a whole array of dis-
                                                 
87 Even though the Tunisian government had already announced in the mid-1990s that it wanted to foster technologi-
cally demanding activities through the technopôles approach, there are still relatively few tangible results until the 
present time as the implementation of this policy almost took a decade to gather momentum. This ‘time lag’ has to 
be taken into account when attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of Tunisia’s IP. 
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criminatory laws, but these are generally rather reactive and ‘adhocish’, i.e. meant to cush-
ion, or foster, certain branches or groups in a given situation and context.88 
The partial lack of response on the part of business is of course not only due to some in-
consistencies at the level of policy implementation, but also due to specific interests 
among key business groups which prevent them from venturing head-on into technologi-
cally demanding fields. These are mainly related to the continuing availability of eco-
nomic windfalls (‘quasi-rents’). They include the possibility (especially for the powerful 
and well-connected owners of the country’s large, family-based holdings) to exploit the 
opportunities available to them thanks to the country’s still strongly fragmented factor 
markets, and their own personal relationships with the political leadership. Many of these 
business leaders and of the presidential relatives have thus come to form highly integrated 
networks of ‘privilege’ and ‘redistribution’. All of these allow them to yield an income 
which is definitely above what they would have been able to realise in the ‘marketplace’. 
No wonder that this definitely reduces their appetite for ‘unnecessary risks’. 
It appears that the policy pursued so far has somewhat reached the limits of its potential 
and that further substantial amendments at various levels will be needed to consolidate the 
numerous achievement of the past decades and reach the next stage of industrial develop-
ment. The envisaged economic transition and qualitative breakthrough towards a fully 
industrialised and high value added economy will not only require profound changes with 
regard to the policies that regulate the allocation of national resources, but also with regard 
to the functioning of those institutions which govern transactions among economic sub-
jects. Such a transition, in order to be successful, will also require a larger degree of capi-
tal accumulation (including at the level of human capital). Tunisians will need to go be-
yond a policy that is still mainly focused on attracting FDI, creating jobs, and boosting 
exports, but which refuses to fully free private operators from state tutelage. The govern-
ment must allow investors unrestrained access to local factor markets (including suppos-
edly ‘sensitive’ ones), and award them the necessary degree of institutionalised protection 
against predatory behaviour of whichever sort. As an informed observer has rightly 
pointed out recently, “Tunisia actually has no choice if it wants to retain its vigour and remain 
the development model which it still is. Not in order to make its critics shut up, improve its image 
or give in to foreign pressures, but because its future is at stake (…). Otherwise, we risk seeing 
Tunisia stagnate, at a certainly very respectable level, but far from its presumable potential.“89 
 
                                                 
88 Even though the government has repeatedly announced that it wants to foster the emergence of ‘economic beacons’ 
and ‘national champions’, it has failed to come up with a policy that would enable it to deliver on its discourse 
(which would entail a profound change of existing laws). The same applies to its announcements to support the de-
velopment of SMEs: apart from a few incentives on a fiscal level, there is no systematic policy in place to ensure its 
implementation on the ground. So far, Tunisian policy responses have therefore covered a very wide range: from 
strict non-intervention via market-enhancing policies (both targeted and untargeted) to supply-side policies (again 
both targeted and untargeted). In general, the Tunisian government has clearly preferred untargeted supply-side 
policies; whenever it has pursued targeted supply-side policies, this seems to have not been a pro-active, voluntary 
choice on its own, but rather an involuntary, reactive attempt to deal with an existing or emerging problem. 
89  Marwane Ben Yahmed “Où va la Tunisie?” JA 2547, 01/11/09, 24–27 
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Annex 1: Key Economic Data (billion TD, December 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP, Current 
Terms   32,170 35,194 37,767 41,408 45,564 50,955* 55,806*
Change (%) 4.9 1.7 5.6 6.0 4.2 5.4 6.3 4.7* 2.8* 
Consumer Price 
Change   2.7 3.6 2.0 4.5 3.1 5.0 3.7* 
Exports 9,536 9,747 10,343 12,055 13,794 15,558 19,410 23,637 19,462*
Change (%) (EIU)    7.8 3.2 4.4 7.2 5.5 1.6* 
Imports 13,697 13,511 14,039 15,960 17,292 20,004 24,437 30,239 25,692*
Change (%) (EIU)    3.5 1.1 6.6 5.3 5.6 3.2* 
Current Acc.  
Balance     -1.1 -2.0 -2.5 -4.2 -3.8* 
Investment (GFCF)     8,479 9,690 10,965 12,790* 14,630*
Change (%) (EIU)    0.1 2.4 4.1 4.8 5.4 3.2 
* Estimates 
Source: Own compilation from various sources (INS; API; CEPEX; FIPA; EIU; GTAI; NB: there 
 are certain inconsistencies among these data) 
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Annex 2: Tunisian Industrial Statistics (2008) 
a) Number of enterprises 
 TE* ATE* Total % 
Agro-alimentary 156 857 1013 18 
Building materials, ceramic and glass 24 400 424 7 
Mechanical and metallurgical 135 411 546 10 
Electric, electronic and household appliances 221 130 351 6 
Chemical (without plastic) 101 390 491 9 
Textile and clothing 1 731 355 2 086 37 
Wood, cork and furniture 29 161 190 3 
Leather and footwear 209 93 302 5 
Diverse 64 235 299 5 
Total 2 670 3 032 5 702 100 
*: TE: Totally exporting; *: ATE: Other than totally exporting 
 
b) Production and value-added  
 Production Value-Added
Agro-alimentary 8 959 1 404 
Building materials, ceramic and glasses  2 315,5 867 
Mechanical and metallurgical 3 382 981 
Electric, electronic and household appliances 3 761 602 
Chemical (without plastic) 3 006 213 
Textile and clothing 5 241 1 677 
Wood, cork and furniture 1 320 302 
Leather and footwear 1 278 520 
Diverse 1 454 403 
Total 30 716,5 6 969 
 
 
 
Industrial Policy in Tunisia 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 59
c) Investments in manufacturing 
 Million TD % 
Agro-alimentary 270 23 
Building materials, ceramic and glass  189,4 16 
Mechanical and metallurgical 133 11 
Electric, electronic and household appliances 153 13 
Chemical (without plastic) 140 12 
Textile and clothing 150 13 
Wood, cork and furniture 33,5 3 
Leather and footwear 30 3 
Diverse 85 7 
Total 1 183,9 100 
 
d) Employment in manufacturing 
 No. employees % 
Agro-alimentary 63 603 13 
Building materials, ceramic and glass  27 576 6 
Mechanical and metallurgical 32 200 7 
Electric, electronic and household appliances 62 490 13 
Chemical (without plastic) 23 776 5 
Textile and Clothing 210 112 44 
Wood, cork and furniture 9 640 2 
Leather and footwear 30 214 6 
Diverse 18 214 4 
Total 477 825 100 
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e) Exports of manufactured goods  
 Million TD    % 
Agro-alimentary 1 616 11 
Building materials, ceramic and glass   302,4 2 
Mechanical and metallurgical 1 186 8 
Electric, electronic and household appliances 3 566 25 
Chemical (without plastic) 1 107 8 
Textile and clothing 5 185 36 
Wood, cork and furniture 63 1 
Leather and footwear 870 6 
Diverse  454 3 
Total 14 349 100 
 
f) Imports of manufactured goods 
 Million TD % 
Agro-alimentary 2 042 11 
Building materials, ceramic and glass  207,2 1 
Mechanics and metallurgical 4 098 23 
Electric, electronic and household appliances 3 659 20 
Chemical (without plastic) 2 231,1 12 
Textile and clothing 3 532 20 
Wood, cork and furniture 283 2 
Leather and footwear 368 2 
Diverse 1 583 9 
Total 18 003,3 100 
Source: API Online, June 2009 
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Annex 3: Classification of Enterprises (Annual Turnover) 
The top ten enterprises of Tunisia (Turnover 2006–2007, Dinar in thousand) 
Ste Tunisienne des Industries de Raffinage (STIR) Petroleum & petroleum products 2.298.700 2.720.900 
Ste Tunisienne de l’Electricité et du Gaz (STEG) Energy 1.493.600 1.632.400 
Groupe Chimique Tunisien (GCT) Mines/Chemicals 1.109.000 1.368.000 
Ste Nationale de Distribution de Pétrole (AGIL) 
Petroleum & petroleum 
products 1.159.533 1.262.782 
Tunisie Telecom (TT) Telecommunication 1.134.510 1.193.769 
Entreprise Tunisienne des Activités Pétrolières 
(ETAP) 
Petroleum & petroleum 
products 772.037 1.022.149 
Groupe Tunisair Transport 949.455 960.730 
Régie Nationale Tabacs et Allumettes (RNTA) Agro-alimentary 802.200 872.400 
Tunisiana Telecommunication 580.046 682.551 
Total Tunisie 
Petroleum & petroleum 
products 519.000 618.156 
Shell 
Petroleum & petroleum 
products 515.550 599.469 
Pharmacie Centrale de Tunisie (PCT) Pharmaceutics 508.757 568.858 
Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa (CPG) Mines/Chemicals 338.100 414.000 
Nouvelair Transport 335.757 378.486 
Office Nationale de l’Huile Agro-alimentary 351.169 327.756 
The top ten private groups of Tunisia (Turnover 2006–2007, Dinar in thousand) 
Groupe SFBT Agro-alimentary 938.360 992.030 
Poulina Group Holding Diverse 662.428 826.497 
Groupe Elloumi Diverse 600.000 785.000 
Groupe Mabrouk Diverse 750.000 750.000 
Groupe Delice Agro-alimentary 591.716 678.569 
Groupe TTS Tourism/Transport 435.300 489.500 
Groupe One Tech Electric-Electronic 343.000 402.000 
Groupe Karthago Tourism/Transport 342.477 377.855 
Groupe Loukil Diverse 254.000 356.000 
Groupe Meublatex (El Mouradi) Hotel/furniture 324.900 325.960 
Groupe Mohsen Hachicha Diverse 280.000 317.000 
Groupe Hamrouni Diverse 267.000 305.000 
Groupe Jal Tunisie Leather/footwear 220.000 220.000 
Holding Hedi Djilani Diverse n.d. 204.529 
Groupe Bayahi Diverse 200.000 200.000 
Source: L’Economiste Maghrébin 487/488, Jan. 2009 
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Annex 4: Tunisia’s Industrial Strategy ‘Horizon 2016’: Main Target Branches 
electronics/ ICT 
applied to  
automobile & 
aeronautical  
industries 
biotechnology 
applied to the  
environmental and 
agri-food sectors 
mechatronics plastic industries 
applied to  
paramedical &  
pharmaceutical  
industries 
Cross-Over 
Electrical  
applications used 
in renewable ener-
gies 
IT applied to  
bioinformatics 
environmental 
services applied 
to  
textiles  
industries 
- 
Industrial 
Services 
ICT business support 
services & business 
process  
outsourcing 
logistic services other services 
Emerging 
Sectors 
electronic  
industries 
automobile & aero-
nautical  
industries 
technical plastics pharmaceutical & 
biotechnological 
industries 
Traditional 
Sectors 
agri-food  
industries 
textiles/clothing & 
leather/footwear 
industries 
phosphate & 
chemical  
industries 
mechanical &  
electrical industries 
Source: MIEPME & API 
 
A
nn
ex
 5
: T
un
isi
a’
s l
at
es
t r
es
ul
ts
 in
 e
co
no
m
y 
re
la
te
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
an
ki
ng
s 
N
am
e 
of
 r
an
ki
ng
 
Is
su
in
g 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
Sc
or
e 
ob
ta
in
ed
 
Po
sit
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
C
ou
nt
ri
es
 
su
rv
ey
ed
 
Fu
rt
he
r 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
H
um
an
 D
ev
el
op
-
m
en
t I
nd
ex
 (2
00
9)
 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
(U
N
D
P)
 
0,
76
9 
(+
0,
00
6)
 
M
ed
iu
m
 D
ev
el
op
ed
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
Sc
al
e 
of
 0
,0
 –
 1
,0
 
98
 
18
2 
ht
tp
://
hd
r.u
nd
p.
or
g/
en
/m
ed
ia
/ 
H
D
R
_2
00
9_
EN
_C
om
pl
et
e.
pd
f 
 
B
er
te
ls
m
an
n 
Tr
an
s-
fo
rm
at
io
n 
In
de
x 
(2
00
8)
 
B
er
te
ls
m
an
n 
Fo
un
da
tio
n 
/ 
C
en
tre
 o
f A
pp
lie
d 
Po
lit
ic
s 
St
at
us
 In
de
x:
   
   
   
   
 5
,3
7 
– 
D
em
oc
ra
cy
   
   
   
   
3,
95
 
– 
M
ar
ke
t E
co
no
m
y 
  6
,7
9 
M
an
ag
em
en
t I
nd
ex
:  
4,
75
 
Sc
al
e 
of
 1
 –
 1
0 
73
 
93
 
35
 
73
 
12
5 
12
5 
12
5 
12
5 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.b
er
te
ls
m
an
n-
tra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n-
in
de
x.
de
/  
Ec
on
om
ic
 F
re
ed
om
 
In
de
x 
(2
00
9)
 
H
er
ita
ge
 F
ou
nd
at
io
n 
/ W
al
l 
St
re
et
 Jo
ur
na
l 
58
 (-
2,
1)
 
M
os
tly
 u
nf
re
e 
Sc
al
e 
of
 0
 –
 1
00
 
98
 
17
9 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.h
er
ita
ge
.o
rg
/In
de
x/
  
G
lo
ba
l C
om
pe
tit
iv
e-
ne
ss
 In
de
x 
(2
00
9)
 
W
or
ld
 E
co
no
m
ic
 F
or
um
 
(W
EF
) 
– 
40
 
13
3 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.w
ef
or
um
.o
rg
/e
n/
in
iti
at
iv
es
/g
cp
/in
de
x.
ht
m
 
Ea
se
 o
f D
oi
ng
 B
us
i-
ne
ss
 R
ep
or
t (
20
09
) 
W
or
ld
 B
an
k 
/ I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l 
Fi
na
nc
e 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
(I
FC
) 
– 
73
 
18
1 
w
w
w
.d
oi
ng
bu
si
ne
ss
.o
rg
/e
co
no
m
y/
ra
nk
in
gs
 
C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
Pe
rc
ep
-
tio
n 
In
de
x 
(2
00
7)
 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
(T
I)
 
– 
61
 
18
0 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
.o
rg
/p
ub
lic
at
io
ns
/g
cr
  
So
ur
ce
:  
O
w
n 
co
m
pi
la
tio
n 
fr
om
 v
ar
io
us
 so
ur
ce
s 
 
Publications of the German Development Institute 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
Messner, Dirk / Imme Scholz (eds.): Zukunftsfragen der Entwicklungspolitik, 410 p., 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1005-0 
Neubert, Susanne / Waltina Scheumann / Annette van Edig, / Walter Huppert (eds.): Integ-
riertes Wasserressourcen-Management (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Praxis über-
führen, 314 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-1111-1 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Armutsorientierte landwirtschaftliche und ländliche Ent-
wicklung, 342 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0555-3 
Liebig, Klaus: Internationale Regulierung geistiger Eigentumsrechte und Wissenserwerb 
in Entwicklungsländern: Eine ökonomische Analyse, 233 p., Nomos, Baden-
Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2379-2 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungs-
politik 1) 
Schlumberger, Oliver: Autoritarismus in der arabischen Welt: Ursachen, Trends und in-
ternationale Demokratieförderung, 225 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 
978-3-8329-3114-8 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 2) 
Qualmann, Regine: South Africa’s Reintegration into World and Regional Markets: Trade 
Liberalization and Emerging Patterns of Specialization in the Post-Apartheid Era, 
206 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-2995-4 (Entwicklungsthe-
orie und Entwicklungspolitik 3) 
Loewe, Markus: Soziale Sicherung, informeller Sektor und das Potenzial von Kleinstversiche-
rungen, 221 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2009, ISBN 978-3-8329-4017-1 (Entwick-
lungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 4) 
Loewe, Markus: Soziale Sicherung in den arabischen Ländern: Determinanten, Defizite und 
Strategien für den informellen Sektor, 286 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 
978-3-8329-5586-1 (Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 7) 
Faust, Jörg / Susanne Neubert (Hrsg.): Wirksamere Entwicklungspolitik: Befunde, Reformen, 
Instrumente, 432 p., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2010, ISBN 978-3-8329-5587-8 (Ent-
wicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik 8) 
[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Book Series with Routledge 
Brandt, Hartmut / Uwe Otzen: Poverty Orientated Agricultural and Rural Development,   
342 p., Routledge, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-36853-7 (Studies in Develop-
ment and Society 12) 
Krause, Matthias: The Political Economy of Water and Sanitation, 282 p., Routledge, Lon-
don 2009, ISBN 978-0-415-99489-7 (Studies in Development and Society 20) 
[Books may be ordered only through publishing house or bookshops.] 
Springer-Verlag 
Scheumann, Waltina / Susanne Neubert / Martin Kipping (eds.): Water Politics and De-
velopment Cooperation: Local Power Plays and Global Governance, 416 p., Ber-
lin 2008, ISBN 978-3-540-76706-0 
Studies 
55 Weinlich, Silke: Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nati-
onen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten ge-
genüber Reformoptionen, 121 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-491-9 
54 Ifejika Speranza, Chinwe: Resilient Adaptation to Climate Change in African Ag-
riculture, 311 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-489-6 
53 Krause, Matthias et al.: Formalisation and Business Development in Mozambique: 
How important are regulations? 131 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-490-2 
52 Voionmaa, Petra / Michael Brüntrup: German Aid for Trade: Past experience, les-
sons learnt, and the way forward, 150 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-488-9 
51 Wiemann, Jürgen et al.: Laos on its Way to WTO Membership: Challenges and 
opportunities for developing high-value agricultural exports, 186 p., Bonn 2009, 
ISBN 978-3-88985-487-2 
50 Makhan, Davina: Linking EU Trade and Development Policies: Lessons form the 
ACP-EU trade negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements, 184 p., Bonn 
2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-486-5 
49 Rhys Jenkins / Enrique Dussel Peters: China and Latin America: Economic rela-
tions in the twenty-first century, 397 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-88985-485-8 
48 Zimmermann, Roukayatou: Agricultural Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unter-
standing CAADP and APRM policy processes, 178 p., Bonn 2009, ISBN 978-3-
88985-484-1 
 [Price: 10,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.] 
Discussion Paper 
20/2010 Haldenwang, Christian von / Maksym Ivanyna: Assessing the Tax Performance 
of Developing Countries, 42 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-528-2 
19/2010 Bučar, Maja: Science and Technology for Development: Coherence of the 
common EU R&D policy with development policy objectives, 48 pl, Bonn 
2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-527-5 
18/2010 Ondřej Horký: The Europeanisation of Development Policy: Acceptance, ac-
commodation and resistance of the Czech Republic, 31 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 
978-3-88985-526-8 
17/2010 Brandi, Clara / Christine Ladenburger / Anna Pegels: Intellectual Property Rights 
as a Challenge to Providing Global Public Goods: The cases of public health, food 
security and climate stability, 49 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-524-4 
16/2010 Kubny, Julia: The Impact of Chinese Outward Investment: Evidence from Cambo-
dia and Vietnam, 25 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-525-1 
15/2010 Furness, Mark: The European External Action Service: A new institutional 
frame- work for EU development cooperation, 35 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-
88985-523-7 
14/2010 Da Costa, Agnes M.: Sustainable Dam Development in Brazil: Between global 
norms and local practices, 54 p., Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-88985-522-0 
[Price: 6,00 Euro; books may be ordered directly from the DIE or through bookshops.] 
A complete list of publications available from DIE can be found at: 
http://www.die-gdi.de 
